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VII.
--Squares.
1. In
1813, France was nearly exhausted of soldiers, so that Napoleon, on
hastily preparing for his campaign of that year, was obliged to
incorporate into his army a large number of raw conscripts, who had
scarcely begun their elementary drill. On the route to their
respective points of concentration, he accordingly ordered his
columns to halt each day, to practise the three movements which he
considered to be the most important for infantry to be familiar
with. These were, forming battalions in square, deploying in line,
and re-forming in column of attack.
2. In the Austrian service, squares formed by a column in mass are
considered preferable to hollow ones, on the supposition that though
horses will recoil from a dense mass, they may be easily brought to
break through a shallow formation, over which they can see the open
ground. But this theory seems to be refuted by numerous facts. A
large proportion of the formations that have successfully repulsed
cavalry, since the beginning of this century, have been hollow
squares.
3. The rule laid down in the Tactics (Par. 143, Skirmishers),
directing the skirmishers, in rallying on the square, to "come
to a ready -without command, and fire upon the enemy; which will
also be done by the reserve, as soon as it is unmasked by the
skirmishers," is an unsound one, for a compliance with it would
be dangerous. A square cannot expect to repulse cavalry by an
irregular fire at will, but only by well-directed volleys. If
cavalry charge a square firing irregularly, it will probably rout
it. On the other hand, if a square wait coolly till the cavalry is
at twenty paces, its volley will be murderous. At Waterloo, the
Allied squares that reserved their fire till the French cavalry had
arrived at from twenty to forty paces, invariably repulsed it. At
that battle, Ney led eleven cavalry charges against the British
squares, every one of which failed. At the opening of the campaign
of 1813, Napoleon had, comparatively, but a handful of cavalry; so
few, that they had to keep close to their infantry for protection.
In crossing the plains of Lutzen, a large and splendid cavalry force
of the Allies, supported by infantry and by horse-artillery, made an
attack on Ney's corps, which consisted chiefly of young and raw
recruits, who saw an enemy for the first time. The situation was
extremely dangerous, and Ney and his principal generals threw
themselves into the squares to encourage them. By volleys delivered
at a signal, the enemy's charges were all repulsed, and the
conscripts acquired great confidence from the ease with which this
was done. Ney then broke up his squares, and, pursuing the enemy in
columns, completed their repulse. At Auerstadt, in 1806, Davoust's
French squares had to sustain a long succession of charges from ten
thousand Prussian horse. By reserving their fire, each time, to
within thirty or forty paces, its effect was so deadly, that a
rampart of dead and disabled men and horses was soon formed around
the squares, and the charges were all repulsed. So, at Jena, on the
same day, Ney, posted in a square, allowed the Prussian cuirassiers
to charge up to within fifteen or twenty paces, when the front
attacked, at his word of command, poured in a fire which completely
repulsed the charge, strewing the whole ground with dead and
wounded. The Prussian cavalry, in that battle, are said to have been
"terrified at the sight of a motionless infantry reserving its
fire." Again, at Mount Tabor, in 1798, General Kleber, marching
with an infantry division of only three thousand men, over an
immense sandy plain, was attacked by twelve thousand Turkish horse.
The French squares resisted their successive charges for six hours,
by means of volleys reserved till the enemy were at the very muzzles
of their guns; which soon built up a rampart around them of men and
horses. Bonaparte then arrived with another division. Dividing it
into two squares, he rapidly advanced them in such a manner as to
enclose the Turks in a kind of triangle; when, by a sudden fire upon
them from three points at once, he drove them upon each other in
confusion, making them flee in every direction. It may be observed,
that advancing or manoeuvring in squares is practicable only on open
and level plains, like the sandy deserts of Egypt and Syria.
4. The best reliance of an infantry square being, therefore, on its
fire by volleys, the men should be instructed to come to a charge
bayonet, instead of a " ready," immediately on forming
square. From this latter position, there would be much greater
danger of the volley being prematurely delivered. The fire of a
single excited man will usually be followed by a general discharge.
5. It may be often advisable that the volley should be delivered by
both ranks at once, and not by a single one. Par. 1191, School of
the Battalion, directing that " a battalion, in square, will
never use any other than the fire by file, or by rank," should
therefore be amended.
6. Moreover, in view of what has been said as to volley-firing, and
of the examples that have been cited in confirmation, there is
reason to doubt the wisdom of the direction contained in Par. 67,
School of the Company: "The fire by file being that which is
most frequently used against an enemy, it is highly important that
it be rendered perfectly familiar to the troops. The instructor
will, therefore, give it almost exclusive preference." The fire
by file, after its commencement, becomes a mere individual fire at
will. Independently of the general ineffectiveness of this kind of
fire, one would have supposed that the instructor's attention should
be rather directed to accustoming the men to the more difficult
reserved fire by volleys, instead of practising them almost
exclusively in a fire which, once learned, they will use
instinctively, and without any practice at all.
7. Infantry breech-loading' weapons would be very useful to troops
in square, when charged by cavalry; since, being rapidly reloaded,
they would enable the square to repulse, with a volley, each
subdivision successively, where the charging column is formed at the
usual distances. But it is doubtful whether, on the whole, these
weapons are preferable to muzzle-loaders. Certain it is, that they
exhaust the ammunition much more rapidly, and so cause a suspension
of fire, and a withdrawal from the line of battle, till a new supply
can arrive. And, to obtain this new supply, a long time is generally
required; infantry ammunition being usually carried in the second,
or more distant ammunition train, instead of the first, or nearest
one, as it ought to be.
8. Although a reserved fire is much the most reliable in repulsing
cavalry, the men may sometimes be ordered to commence the fire at a
considerable distance. In such case, they should be instructed to
aim at the horses, instead of their riders, as affording a better
mark.
9. European cavalry is often practised, on arriving within four
hundred yards, or effective grape-shot distance, of an infantry
square, to halt, and then open at the centre, unmasking a battery of
horse-artillery, which plays for a certain time on the square, when
the cavalry closes again, and charges. A square, however, attacked
in this manner, is not in so much danger of being broken as might be
imagined. The enemy's guns, after being unmasked, would usually
require several trial rounds to get the exact range; and our
sharpshooters, who could safely be thrown forward one hundred yards,
with the new rifled arms, ought, in the mean time, to inflict such
loss on the cavalry, as well as on the battery, as to cause it
either to retire, or to charge feebly, and, therefore,
ineffectively. At the very worst, the square would have ample time
to re-form its ranks, and deliver a deadly volley before the cavalry
could reach it, as it also would if this operation were attempted
much nearer, say at two hundred yards. In this last case, a few
volleys from the square itself, with the new arms, would probably be
destructive enough to prevent the charge altogether.
10. It is hardly necessary to observe, that troops formed in square,
when charged by cavalry, can secure their safety only by standing
firm. A single opening will suffice to let in the enemy, who will
then easily ride over the square, and cut it in pieces. Whereas, if
the square remain unbroken, cavalry can inflict upon it no loss, or
but a trifling one.
11. In repulsing a cavalry charge, coolness and presence of mind,
will sometimes enable troops to accomplish extraordinary results. At
Quatre Bras, the square of the Fortysecond Highlanders was not
completed, the companies still running in to form the rear face,
when the enemy's leading troop entered. But the square,
nevertheless, finished its formation; and the French cavalry,
caught, as it were, in a net, was soon destroyed by the concentrated
fire of all the fronts, which had faced inward. In the same battle,
the Forty-fourth British Regiment, standing in line in two ranks,
was suddenly charged in rear by the French Lancers, who had dashed
round one of their flanks for that purpose. The rear rank suddenly
faced about, and, at a very short distance, poured in a deadly fire,
which put them into confusion. On their way back to re-form, the
front rank, in its turn, gave them a volley, which- destroyed great
numbers of them, and completed their rout.
12. Even when a square has been actually broken, it is not
necessarily lost. If the troops are brave and well disciplined, it
may sometimes be rallied again, re-formed, and made to repulse the
attacking cavalry, as was the case with some of the Allied squares
at Waterloo. So, at the battle of Pultusk, in 1806, a French
battalion that had been broken and overthrown by Russian cavalry,
immediately rallied, fell on the troopers floundering in the mud,
and dispatched them. So, at the battle of Krasnoe, in 1812, a large
Russian square was retreating before the French cavalry masses.
Occasionally, in order to pass a narrow defile, it was obliged,
temporarily, to break the square. At these times the French made
furious charges, penetrated into the column, and captured men and
guns. But as soon as the defile was passed, the Russians instantly
re-formed the square, and continued their retreat. They finally
succeeded in reaching Korytnia, after killing and wounding some four
hundred or five hundred of the French; though with the loss of eight
guns, one thousand prisoners, and seven hundred or eight hundred
hors de combat, out of five thousand or six thousand men.
IX.-Skirmishers.
We
shall consider
First,
THEIR USE.
Secondly, How THEY ARE POSTED.
Thirdly, How THEY ARE HANDLED.
Fourthly, RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISIIERS.
A.
THEIR USE.
1. In
approaching the enemy through a wooded or broken country,
skirmishers thrown out in advance, and on the flanks of the leading
column, are absolutely indispensable, in order to reconnoitre the
ground, and prevent a surprise.
2. Skirmishers protect the main body, or any particular portion of
it, from attack while manoeuvring. A regiment, or a brigade, in
covered ground, whether the. enemy be visible or not, should never
change its position in battle, or maneuver, without the protection
of a skirmishing line.
3. They furnish a screen, behind which the main body may hide its
movements, and be enabled to attack at an unexpected point.
4. Where a ravine, a wood, or other similar obstacle causes a break
in our line of battle, by occupying it with skirmishers we guard it
against penetration by the enemy, and connect the separated corps
with each other.
5. Skirmishers may be used to alarm the enemy at a point where he
expected no attack, and thus create a diversion.
6. By their attack at various points, they serve to unmask the
enemy's position.
7. They may be employed to open the way for a charge with the
bayonet. At the battle of Stone River, the rebels, on one occasion,
advanced in line, With a double column in rear of each wing,
preceded by a double line of skirmishers, who reserved their fire
till close to our line, when they halted, poured in a murderous
fire, and fell back on their main body, which then rushed forward.
Both our first and second lines, staggered by this sudden and
destructive fire, were swept from the ground.
8. Skirmishers have been sometimes thrown forward to test the spirit
and disposition of the enemy. At Biberach, in 1800, the French
general St. Cyr, after having carried the place, and driven the
Austrians through the defile in rear of it back upon their main
body, posted on the heights of Wittenburg, sent forward a strong
line of skirmishers to open fire on them, with the view of
ascertaining their temper and disposition after their van-guard had
been defeated and driven in. This drew forth a general and continued
discharge, like that which demoralized troops are apt to indulge in
to keep up their spirits by their own noise. Seeing this, St. Cyr
instantly prepared to charge, although he had with him but twenty
thousand men, and the Austrians numbered sixty thousand, and were in
a strong position. The result justified his decision; for, on the
near approach of the French, the Austrians fired a volley or two and
then retreated in confusion.
9. Skirmishers should accompany columns of attack; for (1.) They
increase the confidence of the troops they accompany. Placed between
the columns, they advance boldly because the columns advance, and
the columns advance boldly because the skirmishers do. (2.)
Preceding the columns, by driving back the enemy's skirmishers, and
diverting his fire to themselves, they keep the attacking columns as
free from loss as possible till the shock. They, moreover, serve to
annoy the troops we are about to attack, by the incessant sharp
buzzing of their deadly bullets among them, like so many bees,
killing some and disabling others; and this, sometimes, to such a
degree as to demoralize them. It is said that, at Waterloo, the
swarms of skirmishers that covered the French attacking columns so
galled and excited the stationary columns and squares of some of the
Allies, as to nearly drive them from the field. (3.) On the flanks
of a column, they cover them from attack. (4.) They draw the enemy's
fire prematurely, and thus render it comparatively ineffective. (5.)
They prevent the columns from halting to deploy and fire. (6.) They
may sometimes conceal the direction of the march of the attacking
column, and even seize the guns that have been playing on it.
10. In defence, if they can encircle the enemy's advancing column,
they may destroy it by their concentric fire.
11. In a retreat, skirmishers cover the rear, so long as the enemy
attacks without cavalry.
12. The new rifled arms have obviously much increased the
effectiveness of skirmishers.
B.
How POSTED.
1. They
should be always near enough to the main body to be supported by it,
if hard pressed, and also to enable the main body to profit at once
of any advantage that may have been gained by them.
2. They should cover the main body, both in front and in flank,
except where the ground may render this impracticable or
unnecessary; and, in defensive positions, they should occupy every
point from which the enemy's skirmishers might annoy us.
3. In a defensive combat, they should be so posted as to take the
enemy's attack inflank: (1.) Because their fire will be thus the
more destructive; and (2.) They will not be exposed to be driven
back by the enemy's fire, or by his advance.
4. If thrown into an enclosure, they must have an easy exit.
Skirmishers feeling themselves in danger of being cut off, will lose
somewhat of that coolness which is so essential to their efficiency.
5. They should not be kept stationary behind a straight line, as a
wall, a fence, or a hedge; for this would expose them to enfilade.
6. Skirmishers are only auxiliary to the main force, and are not
capable, by themselves, of effecting any decisive result. Therefore,
in order not to exhaust the men, heavy -'skirmishing lines should
not be used, except to lead a decided advance, or to repel one.
7. The principle is, to post skirmishers so as to give them the
maximum of shelter, whilst inflicting the maximum of loss on the
enemy. This applies to the placing of the whole line, and to the
separate groups. The way skirmishers produce their effect is by
sharpshooting, which requires calmness; and the more completely
sheltered they are, the calmer they will be, and the more deadly
will be their aim.
C.
How Handled.
1.
Deploy them before coming within range of musketry; for infantry in
compact order is a good target for the enemy.
2. They should be kept well in hand; especially at the moment of
success, when they are in danger of rushing headlong to destruction.
3. Coming upon the enemy's main body, they should occupy him in
front and flank till our own main body gets up.
4. Except in urgent cases, never deploy a line of skirmishers on a
run; for this makes them lose breath and calmness, and, with their
calmness, their accuracy of aim. So, after deployment, avoid all
rapid and violent movements.
5. Skirmishers become exhausted after long firing. The longer they
continue out, the worse they shoot. Therefore, relieve them often.
6. Skirmishers should be accustomed to lie down at a given signal;
as it is sometimes very important that both our artillery and
infantry should be able to fire over them.
7. In retreat, skirmishers occupy every favorable point for holding
the enemy in check.
D.
RULES FOR INDIVIDUAL SKIRMISIERS.
1. In
advancing, in retreat, or at a halt, use every cover that presents
itself.
2. Preserve the alignment and the intervals, so far as possible. On
open ground, this may be done perfectly. In woods, skirmishers
should never, for a moment, lose sight of each other.
3. The security of the flanks should be looked out for by the men
near them.
4. Run over exposed ground as quickly as possible.
5. Approach the crest of a hill with great caution.
6. If threatened by artillery alone, advance and kill off the men
and horses before they get into battery. When the pieces have got
into battery, lie down, if on exposed ground, till they limber up
again, and then recommence the fire.
7. A skirmisher, with the new rifled arms, ought, at five hundred
yards, to be more than a match for a gun; for, in men and horses, he
has a much larger target than the gun has in him. Again, with the
new rifle shells, he may be able to blow up a caisson.
8. Neither should a skirmisher have much to fear from a single
horseman. With his bayonet fixed, he would usually be able to defend
himself successfully against the trooper, whose sabre is the shorter
weapon of the two; more especially, if he will take care to keep on
the trooper's left, which is his exposed side.
9. Never lose your calmness. Your power consists, not in rapid
firing, but in the accuracy of your aim. Avoid all hurried and
violent movements; and never raise your gun till sure of a shot.
10. The aim, according to the Tactics, is made by bringing the gun
down, instead of raising it up. However little the soldier may be
excited, he will be apt to pull the trigger more or less too soon;
that is, while the muzzle is yet too elevated. This is the reason
why infantry missiles usually fly too high. The difficulty would not
be obviated by causing the aim to be made by raising the piece; for
then the same disturbing cause already mentioned, the soldier's
excitement, would make the shots fly as much too low, as they now
fly too high. Rapid firing is another cause of this incompleteness
of aim. Infantry firing is already too rapid to be effective; so
that what is claimed for the new breech-loading weapons as an
advantage, that they increase the rapidity of fire, furnishes, on
the contrary, a strong objection to them. The effectiveness of the
fire of a sharpshooter, especially, will be usually in inverse,
instead of direct proportion to the number of shots he delivers in a
given time. In view of this, and of the tendency to pull the trigger
before the muzzle is sufficiently depressed, it has become an
established maxim, to "Aim low, Fire slow "
TACTICAL
USE OF ARTILLERY.
THE
subject will be treated under the following heads:
I.-HOW
POSTED WITII RESPECT TO THE GROUND.
II.-HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO OUR OWN TROOPS.
III.-HOW POSTED WITH RESPECT TO THE ENEMY.
IV.-POSTING OF BATTERIES AND PIECES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES.
V.-HOW USED.
VI. -ITS FIRE.
VII.-ITS SUPPORTS..
I.
How posted with respect to the Ground.
1.
Artillery has a much longer range than musketry. In order to avail
ourselves of this advantage, we must so post it as to overlook all
the ground to which its utmost range extends. It therefore requires
an elevated position.
2. It has been considered an additional advantage of a commanding
position for artillery, that it enables our guns to cover our
infantry, attacking or attacked, by firing over their heads. This
was done by the French at Waterloo, apparently with great effect.
But the advantage is a doubtful one; for firing over our own troops,
especially with cast-shot or shell, is very dangerous to them, and
is apt to intimidate them. It moreover furnishes to the enemy a
double target. The shot which miss our troops will be apt to fall
among the guns behind them; and some of those which do not reach the
guns, will probably take effect among the troops in front of them.
3. But very high points are unfavorable positions for batteries.
Batteries so placed would not command the ground immediately below
them; as guns cannot be depressed to fire below a certain angle
without soon destroying their carriages. And this would facilitate
their capture; for, once arrived on the ground near them, the
assailants could not be injured by their fire. It has been estimated
that the slope in front of a battery should not exceed one
perpendicular to fifteen base.
4. When guns have to be used as a support to other parts of the
line, which is often the case, their capture might lead to serious
consequences. They should therefore have the ground clear of all
obstacles which may mask their fire, not only in front, but to their
right and left.
5. Although the most favorable position for guns is an eminence
sloping gradually towards the enemy, an open and level plain is by
no means an unfavorable one; for, on such ground, the enemy will be
visible at a great distance, and our shot may act by ricochet, which
causes more destruction than ordinary point-blank firing. For
ricochet, firm and even ground is requisite; on soft or rough ground
it is not attainable.
6. In enfilading the enemy's position, or in raking his advancing
columns from head to rear, a grazing fire is the most destructive
that can be used. This consists of a long succession of ricochets at
low heights. Where the ground is level and firm, we can obtain this
fire at a short distance from the enemy; as, on such ground,
ricochet shots do not rise much. But where the ground is uneven, to
obtain such a fire, a more distant position will be requisite.
7. Muddy ground is unfavorable for artillery. Over such ground, its
carriages move slowly, and its fire is less effective. Balls cannot
ricochet; and shells often sink into the mud, and thus are either
extinguished or explode with but little effect. Napoleon depended so
much on his artillery at Waterloo that, although every moment was
precious, he delayed commencing the battle till his chief of
artillery had reported the ground, which had been covered by a
soaking rain, to be sufficiently dry for the movements and
effectiveness of that arm. The three hours' delay thus caused, would
have sufficed him to crush Wellington's army before the arrival of
the Prussians.
8. Stony ground is a bad location for a battery; for the enemy's
shot will scatter the stones around it with more or less fatal
effect.
9. Rough or uneven ground immediately in front of a battery is not
objectionable, as it will stop the enemy's shot.
10. A battery, when it is possible to avoid it, should not be posted
within musket range of woods, bushes, ravines, hedges, ditches, or
other cover from which the enemy's sharpshooters might kill off the
gunners, or, by a sudden dash, capture the guns.
11.
To prevent the enemy from approaching a battery under cover, it
should be so placed as to be able to sweep all villages, hollows,
and woods, in front and in flank.
12. In taking up a position, a battery should avail itself of all
inequalities of the ground, for the shelter of its pieces and
gunners, or of its limbers and caissons, at least. For the same
purpose, a battery posted on an eminence should have its pieces some
ten paces behind its crest.
13. Where the ground affords no shelter, and where the position of
the guns is not likely to be changed, it may be worth while to cover
them by an epaulement or breastwork, some three feet, or more, high.
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