II. --How posted with respect to our own Troops.

1. In order to be ready to support the flank of our attacking columns, and to aid in the defence in every part of the field, batteries should be placed at several different points in the line of battle.
2. In a defensive battle especially, as it is uncertain on what point the enemy will mass his principal attack, the artillery should usually be distributed through the whole line.
3. A line of battle has been compared to the front of a fortification, of which the infantry is the curtain, and the artillery batteries the bastions.
4. The lighter guns should be placed on the salient points of our line, from which they can be more easily withdrawn; the heavier guns, constituting the stationary batteries, on the more retired points.
5. Pieces should not be placed in prolongation with troops; for this would be giving the enemy a double mark. Artillery posted in front of other troops will draw a fire on them. When a battery must be placed in front of the line, let the infantry in rear of it clear the ground by ploying into double columns.
6. Never place artillery so as to impede the movements of the other two arms. A battery posted in front of the centre would often ham]per the movements of the infantry; besides being peculiarly exposed to a converging fire from the enemy's batteries.
7. The safest position for a battery is on that wing which is most secure from a flank attack. But guns should re-enforce the weaker points, thus making the enemy attack the strongest ones. Therefore, where a wing is weak, place the largest number of guns there, to support it. If we have one wing entirely uncovered, of four batteries, for instance, we should give three to the uncovered wing.
8. Of the heavy batteries, one, at least, should be placed in the first line, so that we may be able to open an effective fire on the enemy at the earliest possible moment.
9. The prompt use, at the proper moment, of the reserve, may decide the battle. The movements of heavy artillery, therefore, are too slow for the reserve, which should have most of the light pieces. Horse artillery is especially suitable for it.
10. Guns near an infantry square should be posted at its angles. If the square is charged by cavalry, the gunners run into the square, after filling their ammunition pouches, which they take in with them, as well as their sponges and other equipments. The limbers and caissons are sent to the rear; or, if there is no time to do this, they may be brought into the square. If this is impossible, they may be formed into a barricade. At Waterloo, on the French cavalry's retiring from their charges on the enemy's squares, the British gunners rushed out from the squares in which they had taken refuge, and plied their guns on the retiring squadrons.

III. --How posted with respect to the Enemy.

1. If the enemy's batteries are concentrated in one position, by placing our own batteries properly we may obtain a powerful cross-fire on them.
2. It is always advantageous to so dispose our batteries as to take those of the enemy in enfilade, or obliquely (en echarpe, as it is called). At the battle of Murfreesboro', in December, 1862, a rebel battery, being taken in enfilade by one of our own, was silenced in about five minutes.
3. So, also, if we can obtain an oblique or enfilading fire on his troops, it will be very destructive. A flanking battery, raking the enemy's position, is often enough, of itself, to decide a battle. Thus, the battle of Chippewa was finally decided by our getting a gun or two in a flanking position, enabling us to enfilade the British line. So, at the battle of Shiloh, the rebels' triumphant advance on the evening of the first day was effectually checked by the fire of our gunboats Tyler and Lexington, which had taken an enfilading position opposite their right flank.
4. For this reason, we must never post one of our own batteries so that the enemy's guns will take it obliquely, or in flank; unless, indeed, by doing so, we may probably obtain some important and decisive effect before it can be destroyed, or made unserviceable.
5. Batteries should be so placed as to command the whole ground in our front, even almost up to our bayonets, and so as to be able to direct their fire towards every point; at all events, so that a fire can be kept up on the enemy till he is within short musket-range. It is manifest that the best position for a battery, to enable it to effectually cover the entire ground in our front, would not be in our line of battle, but in advance of one of its flanks, from which it could take the enemy's troops advancing over it, in enfilade. 6. Artillery fire from an unexpected quarter always has a powerful moral effect. Two guns, even, hoisted up to a place where the enemy does not dream of there being any, may have a decisive effect.

IV.-Posting of Batteries and of Pieces as between themselves.

1. The best mode of posting batteries is in the form of a crescent, its horns pointing towards the enemy, or forming the sides of a re-entering angle; for this gives a convergent fire to the enemy's divergent one. Its inconvenience is, the exposure of its flanks to attack, or to enfilade. Therefore, when such a position is adopted, its flanks must be protected by natural obstacles or by artificial defences.
2. Batteries, or parts of batteries, should be at supporting distances from each other; that is, not over six hundred yards apart, so as to effectually cover the whole ground between them, in case of need, with grape and canister. When rifled guns are used, this distance may be increased.
3. A long line of guns in our line of battle is objectionable; for, if it should become necessary to withdraw them, they would leave a dangerous interval.
4. It is dangerous to collect a great many pieces in one battery, especially in the beginning of an action, when the enemy is fresh, for it strongly tempts him to capture it. When used, such a battery should have powerful supports to protect it, or should be sheltered by a village, a defile, or other cover, occupied beforehand.
5. Although, to be used offensively, guns should be in strong masses, in order to strike a decisive blow on some single point; this is by no means the case when used defensively; for, (1.) It is only when guns are more or less scattered over different parts of the field, that they can be made to give a cross-fire on the enemy's advancing columns, or on any part of his line. (2.) If the position where they are massed does not happen to be attacked, they -become useless, while stripping the rest of the line. (3.) If they are captured, all the artillery is lost at once, as happened to the Austrians at the battle of Leuthen, causing their defeat.
6. A certain number of pieces of horse-artillery must always be kept in reserve, so that, if an artillery fire at any point should be suddenly wanted, it may be furnished with the least possible delay.
7. Guns of various calibres should never be in the same battery, to prevent confusion as to the respective ranges, and in the supply of their ammunition.
8. An independent section or battery should never consist of howitzers alone, for the proper fire of these pieces is too slow to be effective in repulsing an attack on them.
9. There should always be wide intervals between the pieces; otherwise the battery would offer too good a mark to the enemy.

V. --How used.

First, GENERALLY. Secondly, IN OFFENSIVE COMBAT. Thirdly, IN DEF>ENSIVE COMBAT. Fourthly, AGAINST INFANTRY. Fifthly, AGAINST CAVALRY. Lastly, AGAINST ARTILLERY.

1. So far as is possible, guns should be kept hiddenfrowm the enemy till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, or other cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front of them. The surprise will add much to their effect. Moreover, concealed, they will be less exposed to be taken. Nothing discourages troops more than the loss of a battery at the beginning of an action.
2. A desultory and indiscriminate artillery fire will accomplish nothing. To effect any thing important, it must be concentrated on some object; and the fire must be persevered in till the desired effect has been produced.
3. It is a general principle that artillery should not reply to the enemy's batteries, unless compelled to by their effect on our own troops. To obtain the most decisive effects from artillery fire, it should be directed on the enemy' s troops, instead of his guns.
4. If it should become advisable to silence one of his batteries, it will be done more promptly and effectually by the employment, for this purpose, of two of our own batteries, than of a single one.
5. There is usually great advantage in keeping our batteries constantly shifting their position; for then(1.) They have the effect of a surprise, by opening on the enemy at some unexpected point. (2.) They make the enemy believe our guns to be more numerous than they really are. (3.) They are in less danger of being captured. But these changes of position are attended with this inconvenience, that they expose the horses to be taken in flank by the enemy's batteries and sharpshooters.
6. The movements of a battery in the field should be as rapid as possible; for, while moving, it is helpless and exposed. Moreover, celerity of movement and accuracy of fire will often more than compensate for inferiority in the number of guns; as was the case at the battle of Palo Alto, in the Mexican War, where the enemy's guns outnumbered ours two to one.

1. When used to prepare for an attack of infantry or cavalry, artillery concentrates as much fire as possible on the point where the attack is to be made, in order to overcome the resistance there, and thus make success easy.
2. When there are several points on which our fire should be directed, we must not batter them all at once, but concentrate our whole fire on them in succession. 3. In attack, artillery should not be split up among different brigades or divisions; else no decisive result can be expected from it. Whole batteries, used together, will have a more telling effect than if scattered over the field in separate sections. In no case should less than two pieces be used together; for, while one piece is being loaded, the piece and its gunners need the protection of another one ready to be discharged.
4. Pieces in support of an infantry column of attack should never be in its rear, but on its flanks, near its head, in which position it will best encourage the infantry. But if a battery have already a position from which it can afford to the attack effective assistance, it should remain in it; sending a few pieces to accompany the infantry, which always greatly values artillery support.
5. Powerful effects may be produced by the sudden assemblage of a great number of guns on some particular point. This was a favorite maneuver of Napoleon; who, by his rapid concentration of immense batteries of light artillery on the important point, usually obtained the most decisive results. At Wagram, for instance, when Macdonald's column was ready to make its great charge on the Austrian centre, Napoleon suddenly massed one hundred guns in front of his own centre, and made it advance in double column at a trot, then deploy into line on the leading section, and concentrate its fire on the villages forming the keys to the enemy's position, in front of his right and left wings respectively; each battery opening its fire on arriving at half-range distance. The effect was overwhelming.
6. The nearer artillery delivers its fire, the more powerful, of course, are its effects. Horse artillery, in sufficient strength, attacking the enemy at short grape-shot distance, say within three hundred or four hundred yards, may lose half its pieces, but with the other half it will probably decide the battle at that point. At Palo Alto, Duncan's rapid closing with his guns to less than half range, drove back the Mexican right wing, which could not stand the destructive fire.
7. Horse artillery does not usually attempt to follow up cavalry in its attack; but takes a position to cover its retreat, if repulsed, or to push forward in support, in case of success.
8. When cavalry has to debouch from a defile, horse artillery may render it most effectual assistance, by taking a position that will enable the cavalry to form without fear of being charged and destroyed while forming.

1. Artillery should always reserve its fire till the enemy's real attack.
2. It should play on that portion of the hostile force that threatens us most.
3. It should wait till the enemy has come within destructive distance, and then open on his columns with a concentrated fire.
4. It should protect our troops while manoeuvring, and accompany them in retreat.
5. We must subdivide our batteries whenever we wish to obtain cross-fires on a debouche, or on the head of an advancing column, or on the ground in front of a weak part of our line. By so doing, we compel the enemy to divide his own artillery in order to reply to our fire.
6. A sudden concentration of a great number of guns at some particular point may be used with the same decisive effect in a defensive, as in an offensive battle; though in this case, artillery plays, for the time being, a part strictly offensive. At the battle of Friedland, where the French were attacked by the Russians in overwhelming numbers, Ney's corps was driven back by -a terrific concentrated fire, in front and in flank, from the Russian batteries on the opposite side of the river; its own artillery being too feeble to stand before them. Seeing this, Napoleon instantly ordered all the guns of the different divisions of the corps next to Ney' s, on the left, to be united and thrown in one mass in front of Ney' s corps. Taking post at some hundred paces in front, these batteries, by their powerful fire, soon silenced the Russian batteries; then advancing on the Russian troops that had crossed the river to within grape-shot range, they made frightful havoc in their deep masses. The French infantry, profiting by this, rushed forward and captured the village of Friedland, driving the enemy in their front over the bridges, which they then burned. This was decisive of the battle; for the whole Russian army was then driven into the river. So, at the battle of Kunersdorff, in 1759, after Frederick's left and centre had driven the Russians, and captured seventy guns and many prisoners, Soltikoff promptly massed the whole artillery of his right wing at a single point behind a ravine, which, by its concentrated fire, swept away the flower of the Prussian army in their efforts to force its passage; and Frederick was badly defeated.
7. When compelled to retreat, guns should: retire successively, in echelons of batteries, half batteries, or sections, in order that the fire of one may cover the limbering up and retreat of another. Besides the mutual support thereby afforded, these successive face-abouts of artillery have a powerful moral effect on the pursuing enemy, already more or less disorganized by success. It would be well for some pieces in each echelon to be kept loaded with canister, so as to drive the enemy back if he should press very close.
8. The protection afforded by artillery in retreat is very powerful, as it keeps the enemy constantly at a distance. A fine example of the use of it for this purpose occurred just before the battle of Pea Ridge, in March, 1862. A rear-guard of six hundred men, under General Sigel, was retreating before a force of four regiments of infantry and cavalry, that followed and attacked it on every side. Sigel disposed his guns in echelons, the one of which nearest the enemy played on his attacking squadrons with grape and shell, which suddenly checked them. Instantly profiting by their temporary hesitation, the echelon limbered up and galloped away to another position, while the next echelon, again checking the enemy by its fire, followed its example. By this means, Sigel, cutting his way through a vastly superior force, succeeded, after a retreat of ten miles, in rejoining the main body with but trifling loss.
9. If driven to the last extremity, the gunners should try, at least, to save the horses, and to blow up the caissons they have to abandon. At the battle of La Rothiere, in 1814, where Napoleon, with thirty-two thousand men, was overwhelmed by one hundred thousand Allies, and was obliged to leave fifty guns on the field, he succeeded in bringing off all his gunners and horses.

1. It is an important rule that artillery should play on the enemy's troops, without attending to his batteries, except in urgent cases.
2. Against a deployed line, whether marching by the front or by a flank, case-shot, that is, grape, canister, and spherical case (sometimes called shrapnel), are most suitable; as these all scatter, right and left, to a considerable distance. The best effect of canister is within two hundred yards. Beyond three hundred and fifty yards, it should not be used. The best effect of grape is within four hundred yards. Over six hundred yards, it is not very effective. Spherical case is effective at much greater distances, its range being nearly equal to that of solid shot. Against a line of infantry at a greater distance than six hundred yards, spherical case should be used, chiefly, if not exclusively; as being more likely to be effective than ball.
3. But case-shot are unsuitable against a column, as they consist of a number of small balls which have not momentum enough to penetrate into it to any depth. When the enemy advances in columns, solid shot should plough through them from head to rear, a cross-fire being obtained upon them when possible.
4. Especially should round-shot be used against a close column rushing to attack us through a defile. Grape and canister might sweep down the leading ranks, but the mass of the column sees not the destructive effect; and being carried forward by the pressure of the ranks behind, continues to rush on till the battery is carried, though with more or less loss. At the battle of Seven Pines, on one occasion, when the rebels were advancing in close columns, they were plied with grape and canister from two of our batteries with but little effect. Every discharge made wide gaps in their leading ranks, but these were instantly filled again, and the columns pressed on. A round-shot, on the other hand, comes shrieking and tearing its way through the entire column, carrying destruction to the very rearmost ranks. The hesitation produced is not limited to the leading ranks, but extends throughout the column. Thus both the actual and the moral effect of ball on a close column is much superior to that of grape or canister. At the bridge of Lodi, the Austrian gunners plied the French column with grape. If they had used round-shot instead, it is doubtful whether Bonaparte would have succeeded in carrying the bridge.
5. But a direct fire with ball on the head of a column of attack would be much assisted by the fire of a few light pieces taking it in flank. And, for this fire in flank, case-shot would be powerfully effective; for, from their wide scattering, both their actual and their moral effects would extend through the whole column, from front to rear.
6. A battery with guns enough to keep up a continuous fire has little to fear from an open attack on it by infantry alone. Napoleon observed that no infantry, without artillery, can march one thousand yards on a battery of sixteen guns, well directed and served; for, before clearing two-thirds of the way, they will have been all killed, wounded, or dispersed. This remark was made in reference to smoothbore guns; the new rifled guns should be still more destructive.
7. Against skirmishers, as they offer but a poor mark for ball, grape and canister should alone be used.

1. The ground round a battery should be so obstructed as to prevent the enemy's cavalry from closing on it; but in the case of a light battery, intended for maneuver, so far only as this can be done without impeding the movements of the battery itself.
2. On being threatened by cavalry, a light battery may sometimes promptly change its position to one where the cavalry would attack it at great disadvantage. For instance, if posted on an eminence, and cavalry should attempt to carry it by charging up the slope, instead of awaiting the charge in a position which would allow the cavalry to recover breath, and form on the height, it might run its pieces forward to the very brow of the slope, where the cavalry, having lost their impetus, and with their horses blown, would be nearly helpless and easily repulsed.
3. At a distance, the most effective fire on cavalry is with howitzers, on account of the terror and confusion caused among the horses by the bursting of the shells. On the cavalry's flanks, when within four hundred or five hundred yards, the fire with grape would be most effective. 4. The last discharge should be of canister alone, and made by all the pieces at once, when the battery should be swiftly withdrawn. 5. If the cavalry succeed in reaching the pieces before their withdrawal, the gunners may find temporary refuge under the carriages.

1. As guns in the field should generally play on troops instead of batteries, there should be a reserve of horse artillery to take the enemy's batteries in flank, in case of need, as well as for other purposes.
2.  Though the ordinary use of artillery is against infantry and cavalry only, special circumstances may render it expedient that a certain portion of it should respond to the enemy's batteries. In this case, not over one-third should be used for that purpose.
3. When we have guns in abundance, it might be sometimes advisable, by using several batteries at once, to silence the enemy's guns, before beginning to play on his troops.
4. Artillery properly plays on the enemy's guns (1.) At the moment of their coming into action, for then they are so exposed that our fire will be peculiarly effective, and perhaps to such a degree as to prevent their opening on us. (2.) When our troops move forward to attack, in order to draw away from them the fire of the enemy's batteries, or, at least, to render it unsteady, inaccurate, and ineffective; and (3.) Generally, when his guns are causing us very great damage.
5. Against guns, solid shot or shells only should be used, since they alone are capable of inflicting any serious injury on either guns or their carriages: solid shot, by their great weight and momentum; shells, by their bursting. But within three hundred or four hundred yards, grape and canister would soon destroy the gunners and the horses.
6. Our fire on a hostile battery would not only be very effective when it is coming into action, but at all other times when its flanks are exposed; as in limbering up to move off, or in a flank march. On these occasions we should use grape, if near enough; otherwise, spherical case would be generally the best.
7. When possible to avoid it, a field battery should not be opposed to a battery of position, or, generally, a battery of light guns to one of heavy guns. For even when the numbers of pieces on the two sides are equal, the enemy's superiority in range and in weight of metal would give him such advantage in the duel that our own battery would soon be destroyed or silenced.