VI.-Its Fire.

1. It is important not to commence the fire till our guns are in sure range (1.) Because a harmless fire serves but to embolden the enemy and discourage our own troops. (2.) Because artillery ammunition should never be wasted. The fate of a battle will sometimes depend on there being a sufficient supply of it at a particular moment.
2. The usual maximum distances at which smooth-bore field guns may open fire with any considerable effect, are for 12-pounders, 1100 yards; for 6-pounders, 750 yards. What these distances are in respect to rifled guns, it does not appear to be yet definitively settled. The extreme range of the new rifled six-pounders is said to be three thousand yards; of the twelve-pounders, four thousand five hundred yards.
3. Guns are usually fired by order, and not by salvos, or volleys; and never as soon as loaded, unless delay be dangerous. Artillery fire is formidable only in proportion to its accuracy; and this is attainable only by a cool and calculated aim.
4. Artillery fire should never cease through the whole line at once. This would have a discouraging effect on our own troops, and an inspiriting one on the enemy's. Especially must this not be done when we are about to execute any maneuver; for it would be sure to call the enemy's attention to it. Therefore, if a particular battery has to change its position, it must not cease the fire of all its pieces at once; for, besides its disquieting effect on our troops, it would notify the enemy of the movement.
5. In covering an attack, our guns should keep up their fire till the moment it would begin to endanger our advancing columns.
6. By a ricochet fire, artillery is said to increase its effect, from one-fourth to one-half. It is especially effective in enfilading a line of troops, a battery, or the face of a work taken in flank. Ricochet shots have also great moral effect.
7. When used against breastworks of rails or logs of wood, guns should be fired with moderate or shattering charges; so as more surely to demolish them, and, at the same time, to increase the destructive effect of the fire by scattering the splinters. In view of the frequent necessity of battering such defences, and of using a ricochet fire, which also requires small charges of powder, it would be an improvement in our artillery service to make a certain proportion of the ammunition in each gun limber to consist of cartridges of half the usual size.
8. In bombarding a village during a battle, if our object be to set fire to and destroy it, this will be best accomplished with shells. If we wish merely to drive the enemy from it, solid shot from heavy calibres will be necessary, which will more surely reach and destroy his troops, wherever they may show themselves.
9. The moral effect, both of solid shot and of shells, is much greater than that of grape or other case-shot, from their more fearful effects on the human frame, and from the great number of men that a single ball or shell will kill or fatally wound. One twelve-pound solid shot has been known to kill forty-two men, who happened to be exactly in its range.
10. Ball and shell should be used (1.) When the enemy is at a distance. (2.) When he is in mass. (3.) When he is in several lines. (4.) When his line may be enfiladed.
11. In silencing a battery, our fire should be concentrated on one piece at a time, while some of our guns throw spherical case, from a raking position,' if possible, on the gunners.
12. Though grape has a much less range than ball, yet within four hundred yards, on account of its scattering, its effect is superior to it. The fire of guns double shotted with ball and a stand of grape, is fearfully destructive when used at a short distance to repel a charge.
13. It is artillerymen's point of honor not to abandon their pieces till the last extremity. They should always remember that when the enemy is closing on them, the last discharge will be the most destructive of all, and may suffice to repulse the attack and turn the tide of battle. In our attack on Quebec, in our War of Independence, on the near approach of our assaulting column, the British gunners fled from their pieces; but the one who fled last, before leaving, discharged his gun, which was loaded with grape. The discharge killed and wounded several of our men; among them the brave General Montgomery, who was leading the column in person. The effect was decisive. The assailants fell back, panic-struck at the loss of their commander; and our attack failed.
14. To prevent our own captured pieces from being turned on us by the enemy, it is the artillerymen' s last duty, when it has become evident that the guns cannot be saved, to spike them. The operation requiring but a few moments, it can rarely be omitted without disgrace.

VII. --Its Supports.

1. Artillery must always be protected from the mne le, in which it is helpless, whether against infantry or cavalry; and should therefore have a strong support.
2. A portion, at least, of every artillery support, should consist of sharpshooters, whose fire will be the most effective in driving off skirmishers sent forward to threaten or attack the guns, or to pick off the gunners.
3. Batteries must be secured on both flanks, and their supports will be posted with that view; on one or on both flanks, according to circumstances, and more or less retired.
4. A support should never be directly in rear of the battery, where it would be in danger, not only of receiving the shots aimed at the battery, but also of killing the gunners belonging to it, as has repeatedly happened during the late war. 6. A battery and its support owe each other mutual protection. Therefore, when an infantry support, after holding the enemy in check, to enable the battery to limber up and retire, is obliged, in its turn, to retreat, the battery should take- such a position as will enable it to cover the retreat by its fire. 6. A battery consisting of any considerable number of pieces may be able, sometimes, to dispense with a support. During the battle of Ucles, in Spain, in 1809, the French artillery, under General Senarmont, had been left behind, owing to the badness of the roads. The Spaniards came down upon it in large force. On their approach, the guns were formed in square, and, by their fire on every side, defended themselves successfully, and finally repulsed the enemy. So, at Leipsic, in 1813, when the grand battery of the Guard, which had been left temporarily without a support, was charged by the Russian hussars and Cossacks, Drouot, its commander, rapidly drew back its flanks till they nearly met; and the cavalry were soon repulsed by its fire.
7. At the battle of Hanau, in 1813, Drouot's eighty guns were charged by the Allied cavalry. Having no supports, he placed his gunners in front of them with their carbines. This checked the cavalry, who were then covered with grape, which drove them back to their lines. Ought not our gunners also to have carbines slung on their backs for such emergencies Against infantry, our guns would often need no other support. The carbines could be used to reply to the enemy's skirmishers; and the example just' cited shows that, thus equipped, artillerymen may sometimes successfully defend their pieces even against cavalry.

We shall consider --
I.-ITS FORAMATIONS.
II.-ITS STRONG AND ITS WEAK POINTS.
III.-How IT IS POSTED.
IV.-ITS SUPPORTS.
V. -How IT IS USED.
VI.- How IT FIGHTS.
VII.-ITS CHARGE.
VIII. --ITS ATTACK ON INFANTRY.
And shall conclude with some
IX. -GENERAL REMARKS.

I.-Its Formations.

1. The formations of cavalry for battle are either (1.) In deployed lines. (2.) Lines of regiments, in columns of attack doubled on the centre. (3.) A mixed formation of lines and columns. (4.) Echelons of lines or columns; or(5.) Deep columns.
2. Deployed lines are not objectionable in principle. They are often not advisable; but are sometimes necessary. But long, continuous lines should always be avoided; being unfavorable to rapid manoeuvring, which cavalry is constantly called upon to execute in the field.
3. Cavalry has, in its horses, an unreasoning element, which is not controllable, like men; and is therefore much more easily thrown into disorder than infantry. For this reason, when deployed, it should always be in two lines; the second behind the first; the first line deployed, and the second in columns of squadrons by platoons. There should be also a reserve at a few hundred paces behind the second line. The second line should be near enough to the first to be able to support it, if checked; but not so near as to partake in its disorder, if repulsed.
4. Cavalry should be always in column when expecting to maneuver, or to -be called on to make any rapid movement; this being the formation best adapted for celerity.
5. Cavalry deploys in lines --  (1.) When preparing for a charge in line. (2.) When preparing for any attack requiring the utmost possible width of front; as where the enemy is to be suddenly surrounded. (3.) When it becomes necessary in order to prevent our troops from being outflanked by the enemy's. (4.) When exposed to continued artillery fire, which is much less destructive on a line than on a column.
6. Cavalry should always present afront at least equal to the enemy's; otherwise, its flank, which is cavalry's weak point, will be exposed to attack. When inferior in numbers, we may extend our line by leaving intervals, more or less wide, between its different corps. Any hostile squadrons that may attempt to pass through these intervals to take the line in rear, could be taken care of by the second line.
7. The best formation in respect to mobility is a line of regiments in columns by squadrons, doubled on the centre; corresponding to infantry double columns.
8. The mixed formation of lines and columns is more -manageable than simple lines. Which of these two is preferable depends upon the ground, and upon all the other circumstances of the case.
9. The order in echelons is as good in attack as in retreat; since the echelons mutually support each other.
10. Decidedly the most objectionable of all cavalry formations is that in deep columns: (1.) From the almost entire loss which it involves of its sabres, which are cavalry's peculiar and most effective weapon. (2.) From the long flanks which it exposes to attack.
11. The formation in one rank, instead of two, has been introduced by the new Cavalry Tactics, though it has been as yet but partially adopted in the field. This innovation has two advantages. It doubles the number of sabres to be used against the enemy; and it enables the cavalry to cover double the ground; thus doubling, also, its power to outflank, which is a valuable advantage, especially when opposed to cavalry. Its disadvantage is, that it must, more or less seriously, impair the solidity and vigor of the cavalry charge proper; in which a whole line, with "boot to boot" compactness, comes at once to the shock, like some terrific mechanical engine; and in which the riders in the front rank are compelled to dash on with full speed to the last; knowing that if they slacken rein, even for a moment, they would be ridden over by the rear-rank men one yard behind them. From there being no rear-rank to fill up the gaps caused, during the charge, by the enemy's missiles, or by casualties occasioned by obstacles of the ground, the charging line must generally arrive on the enemy broken and disunited, or as foragers. The moral effect of such a charge on our own men will be unfavorable, as they will not realize the certainty of mutual support at the critical moment; and its moral effect on the enemy must be decidedly inferior to that produced by a charge that is at once swift, solid, and compact. But the force of this objection is somewhat weakened, by the consideration that the compact charge of " cavalry of the line" must hereafter be comparatively rare, in consequence of the introduction of rifled artillery and infantry weapons, with their greatly increased accuracy and range; which ought to cause such slaughter in a line or column of charging cavalry, that, if it arrive at all to the shock, it would generally be only in scattered groups.
12. In- advancing over wooded, or other obstructed ground, it may be necessary to break the line into company columns of fours, as in the infantry maneuver of advancing by the flanks of companies. As the cavalry column of fours corresponds to the march of infantry by the flank, the use of this formation in action is open to the same objections that have been already pointed out as applying to flank marches by infantry.

II.-Its Strong and its Weak Points.

1. The value of cavalry on the battle-field consists chiefly in its velocity and mobility. Its strength is in the sabre-point and spurs.
2. Its charge is accompanied with a powerful moral effect, especially upon inexperienced troops. But,
3. Cavalry has but little solidity, and cannot defend a position against good infantry. For, if it remain passive on the ground it is to hold, the infantry will soon destroy it by its fire, to which it cannot, with any effect, reply; and if it attack at close quarters, the infantry, by means of its defensive formations, will be able, at least, to hold its ground, and probably repulse its charges by a reserved fire. So that the cavalry will finally have no alternative but to retire.
4. It is exposed and helpless during a change of formation; like artillery limbering up, or coming into action.
5. On its flanks, it is the weakest of all arms. A single squadron attacking it suddenly in flank, will break and rout cavalry of ten times its number. At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon kept a few squadrons in rear of either flank, which, on his line being charged by a formidable body of Mamelukes, vastly superior to his own cavalry in numbers, horses, and equipments, nevertheless suddenly fell on their flanks and destroyed them.
6. Cavalry is never so weak as directly after a successful charge; being then exhausted, and in more or less disorder.

III.-How Posted.

1. A part of our cavalry must be so posted as to secure our flanks; remaining in column behind the wings, till the enemy's movements require its deployment. If one wing is covered by natural obstacles, give the cavalry to the uncovered wing; posting it in rear of the flank battalion of the second line.
2. When cavalry is posted on the flanks, it should not usually be on the first line of infantry. If it is to be used for attack, it is better to keep it retired from view till the last moment, in order to strengthen its attack by the powerful moral effect of a surprise. And, used defensively, it will be best posted on the flanks of the second line; since, in advancing to charge, it must have a clear space in its front of at least two hundred or three hundred yards, to enable it to act with freedom and vigor.
3. But if a position can be found for cavalry in front, where it would not be too much exposed, this may sometimes enable it to exercise an important moral effect, by threatening the flank of such of the enemy's troops as may be sent forward to attack. At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, the Wurtemburg cavalry was launched against Blucher' s Prussian cavalry. But, seeing the Prussians drawn up not only in front, but opposite their flank, they lost confidence, charged feebly, and too late. They were consequently repulsed and driven back on the Marine Battalion, which they threw into confusion. So, at the battle of Prairie Grove, in December, 1862, the First Iowa Cavalry, which was held in reserve, by its mere presence, caused every attempt of the rebels' flanking regiments to be abandoned.
4. In order not to impede the manoeuvres of the infantry, cavalry should not fill intervals in the lines, or be placed between the lines. It is dangerous when the ground is such as to require the cavalry in the centre of the first line; for, if it is beaten, a gap is left through which the enemy may penetrate. At the battle of Blenheim, in 1704, Marlborough owed his victory, in great measure, to the Allies' forcing back the cavalry forming the centre of the French army; thus turning the whole of its right wing, and compelling the infantry posted at Blenheim to surrender.
5. Yet cavalry should always be near- enough to the infantry to take immediate part in: the combat; and although it should not be posted in the intervals between infantry corps, it may debouch through them, in order to attack more promptly. At the battle of Friedland, the Russian cavalry charged a French infantry division. Latour Maubourg' s dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers, riding through the battalion intervals, charged the Russians in turn, and drove them back on their infantry, throwing many of them into the river.
6. When both -wings are uncovered, the best place for the cavalry will usually be in rear of the centre of the second line; whence it can be sent in the shortest time to either wing.
7. Cavalry should not be scattered over the field in small detachments, but be kept massed at one or more suitable points; as behind the centre, or behind one wing, or both wings. A small cavalry force should be kept entire; or it will have very little chance of effecting any thing whatever. Cavalry of the line, to produce its decisive effects, must be used in heavy masses. In the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, the French cavalry was distributed among the divisions. Napoleon's subsequent experience led him to give it more concentration, by uniting in one mass all the cavalry belonging to each army corps; and, finally, these masses were again concentrated into independent cavalry corps; leaving to each army corps only cavalry enough to guard it.
8. For tactical operations in the field, cavalry insufficient in number is scarcely better than none at all, as it can never show itself in presence of the enemy's cavalry, which would immediately outflank and destroy it, and must keep close behind its infantry. At the opening of Napoleon's campaign of 1813, he had but very little cavalry to oppose to the overwhelming masses of this arm possessed by the Allies. In consequence of this, he could make no use of it whatever; and the tactical results of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were far inferior to those habitually obtained in his former victories, and were purchased with much greater loss.
9. Small bodies of cavalry threatened by the enemy's cavalry in greatly superior force, may sometimes be saved by taking refuge in an infantry square, as practised by Napoleon at the battle of the Pyramids.
10. Cavalry should remain masked as long as possible; for it produces most effect when its position and movements are hidden, so that a strong force may suddenly be brought upon a weak point. For this reason, a flat, open country is less favorable for this arm than plains with undulations, hills with gentle slopes, woods, villages, and farms; all these being so many facilities for screening cavalry from view.
11. Cavalry should never be brought to the front, except to engage. It is unfortunate when the ground is such as to prevent this; for cavalry, compelled to remain inactive under fire, is in great danger of becoming demoralized.
12. As to the ground: (1.) Cavalry must not rest its flank on a wood, a village, or other cover for an enemy, till it has been occupied by our own troops. If compelled to do so, it should send out patrols to reconnoitre and observe. Its position is no longer tenable from the moment the enemy appears within striking distance on its flank. (2.) It must not be posted on the very ground it is to defend, but in rear of it; as it acts effectively only by its charge. Attacking cavalry must have favorable ground in front; defending cavalry, in rear. An obstacle in either case may be fatal.

IV. --Its Supports.

1. The flanks of cavalry lines or columns are always exposed. They should, therefore, be protected by supports of light cavalry, which can act promptly and swiftly. When behind a line, these supports should be usually in open column, so as to be able to wheel, without a moment's delay, into line.
2. The most effectual mode of protecting the flank of a line or column of cavalry is by means of squadrons in rear, formed in echelons extending outwards; as this exposes the enemy's cavalry that may attempt to charge the main body in flank to be immediately charged in flank themselves; which would be destruction. For this purpose, irregular cavalry may be as effective as any other.
3. This cavalry support or reserve behind the flanks may sometimes play an important offensive part. The enemy's first line, the instant after either making or receiving a charge, is always in greater or less disorder; and a vigorous charge then made on it in flank by our own flank reserve, would have a decisive effect.
4. Cavalry should never engage without a support or reserve in rear, not only to guard its flanks, but also to support it when disorganized by a successful charge.
5. So, when engaged in skirmishing order, being then very much exposed, it must always be protected, like infantry skirmishers, by supports in close order.
6. It has been already seen that, although cavalry may carry a position, it cannot hold it, if attacked by infantry. When used for such a purpose, therefore, it should always be accompanied by an infantry support. The French cavalry succeeded in carrying the plateau of Quatre Bras; but, having no infantry with it to reply to the terrible fire of the Allied infantry from the surrounding houses, it was compelled to retire, and yield it again to the enemy. According to Wellington, Napoleon frequently used his cavalry in seizing positions, which were then immediately occupied by infantry or artillery.

V. --How Used.

1. Cavalry generally manoeuvres at a trot. At a gallop, disorder is apt to take place, and exhaustion of strength that will be needed in the charge.
2. The ordinary use of cavalry is to follow up infantry attacks and complete their success. It should never be sent against fresh infantry; and should generally, therefore, be reserved until towards the last of the action. Napoleon, who, by concentrating his cavalry into considerable masses, had enabled himself to use it on the battle-field as a principal arm, sometimes produced great effects by heavy cavalry charges at the very beginning of the action. But, though Napoleon's splendidly trained heavy cavalry might sometimes break a well disciplined infantry without any preparatory artillery fire, it would be dangerous to attempt this with cavalry inferior to it in solidity; and the new rifled weapons would seem to render the cavalry charges of his day no longer practicable.
3. Cavalry may be hurled against the enemy's infantry (1.) When it has been a long time engaged, and therefore exhausted. (2.) When it has been shattered by artillery. And always should be (1.) When it is manoeuvring. (2.) When the attack would be a surprise. (3.) When its ranks begin to waver, or when it manifests any unequivocal symptom of hesitation or intimidation. In the three latter cases, success will usually be certain; in the two former ones, quite probable: but, in most other cases, a cavalry charge will succeed, perhaps, only one time in ten.
4. The chief duties of cavalry in a defensive battle are (1.) To watch the enemy's cavalry, to prevent its surprising our infantry. (2.) To guard our troops from being outflanked. (3.) To defend our infantry and artillery while manoeuvring. (4.) To be ready to charge the enemy the instant his attack on our troops is repulsed.
5. Used offensively, it must promptly attack (1.) The enemy's flanks, if uncovered. (2.) His infantry, when, from any cause, its attack would probably succeed. (3.) All detachments thrown forward without support.
6. When cavalry has routed cavalry, the victorious squadrons should at once charge in flank the infantry protected by the cavalry just beaten. The great Conde, when only twenty-two years of age, by this means, won the victory of Rocroi.

7. Deployed as skirmishers, by their noise, dust, and smoke, cavalry may furnish a good screen for our movements.
8. Cavalry skirmishers scout their corps, to prevent the enemy reconnoitring it too closely.
9. When a cavalry rear-guard has to defend, temporarily, a defile, a bridge, or a barricade, a part should dismount, and use their carbines till the rest are safe. So, a cavalry vanguard, by its fire, dismounted, may prevent the enemy from destroying a bridge. In these, and in similar cases, the cavalrymen should habitually dismount, in order to render their fire effective; acting and maneuvering as skirmishers.