VI --How it Fights.

1. The success of cavalry in battle depends on the impetuosity of its charge, and its use of the sabre. When deployed as skirmishers, mounted or dismounted, its proper weapon is the carbine or pistol; and in individual combats, these weapons may occasionally be very useful. But when acting as cavalry proper, in any compact formation, it must rely on the sabre. The aim with a pistol or carbine in the hands of a mounted man is so unsteady, that the fire of a line of cavalry is generally ineffective; and there are few occasions where it should be resorted to. When cavalry has learned to realize that these are not its true arms, and that it is never really formidable but when it closes with the enemy at full speed and with uplifted sabre, it has acquired the most important element of its efficiency.
2. Cavalry should, therefore, not fight in columns, as most of its sabres would thereby become useless. But if a facing about to retreat is feared, an attack in column would prevent it. It is said, also, that a column is more imposing than a line. If so, it might have a greater moral effect on the enemy.
3. When cavalry are deployed as skirmishers, as a curtain to hide our movements, they should be in considerable number, with small intervals, and should make as much noise, and smoke, and dust as possible. When the charge is sounded, the skirmishers wait and fall in with the rest.
4. The great rule in cavalry combats is to our own flanks, and gain the enemy's; for these are his and our weakest points.
5. When the enemy's cavalry is already in full charge on our infantry, it is too late for our cavalry to charge it with much prospect of success. In such a case, it would be better to defer our own charge till the moment that the enemy's is completed; for our success then would be certain.
6. Cavalry attacks cavalry in line, in order to have the more sabres, and, if possible, to outflank the enemy.
7. If we can maneuver so as to attack the enemy's cavalry in flank, our success will be certain. Military history affords hundreds of instances in proof of this proposition. At one of the battles in Spain, for example, in 1809, fifteen hundred French horse, by charging four thousand Spanish cavalry in flank, completely cut it in pieces.
8. Cavalry never waits in ~position to be charged by cavalry. Its only safety is in meeting the charge with a violent gallop; it would otherwise be sure to be overthrown. When hostile cavalries thus meet each other, there is usually but small loss on either side. A certain number of troopers are usually dismounted; but the colliding masses somehow ride through each other, allowing but little time for the exchange of points and cuts. Thus cavalry can defend itself against cavalry only by attacking; which it must do even when inferior to the enemy in number.
9. To attack artillery, cavalry should be in three detachments; one-fourth to seize the guns; one-half to charge the supports; and the other fourth as a reserve. The first party attacks in dispersed order, as foragers, trying to gain the flanks of the battery. The second party should maneuver to gain the flanks of the supports.
10. Where a cavalry attack can be masked, so as to operate as a surprise, a battery may be taken by charging- it in front. The formidable Spanish battery in the Pass of Somosierra, was finally carried by a dash of Napoleon's Polish Lancers upon it, suddenly profiting of a temporary fog or mist. But, in ordinary cases, when cavalry has to charge a battery in front, its fire should be drawn by our own guns or infantry, immediately before the charge begins.
11. In an attack on an intrenchment, the office of cavalry can rarely be any thing else than to repulse sorties from the work, and to cut off the enemy' s retreat from it.

VII. --Its Charge.

1. As cavalry acts effectively on the field of battle only by its charge, good cavalry of the line can be formed in no other way than by being exercised in this, its special and peculiar function. On taking command of the Army of Italy in 1796, Bonaparte found the French cavalry to be entirely worthless. They had never been accustomed to charge, and he had the greatest difficulty in making them engage. Seeing the great importance of this arm, he determined to make good cavalry of them by compelling them to fight. So, in his attack on4-orghetto, he sent his cavalry forward, with his grenadiers on their flanks, and his artillery close behind them. Thus enclosed, and led on by Murat to the charge, they attacked and routed that famous Austrian cavalry whose superiority they had so much dreaded. This was the first step in the formation of the splendid French cavalry to which Napoleon afterwards owed so many of his victories. And, at the battle of Hochstedt, on the Danube, in 1801, its superiority over the Austrian cavalry was, at last, completely established.
2. Cavalry charges (1.) In line; but this only on even ground, and at short distances; (2.) In column; and (3.) As foragers, or in dispersed order. But this kind of charge is exceptional. It can rarely be used with safety against any but an uncivilized or an undisciplined foe.
3. A charge in one long continuous line should never be attempted. Such a charge will be usually indecisive, as it cannot be made with the necessary ensemble or unity. The success of a charge in line depends on the preservation of a well-regulated speed and of a perfect alignment; by means of which the whole line reaches the enemy at once. At the charging gait, this is rarely attainable; so that the charge in line, except at short distances, and over very even ground, usually degenerates into a charge by groups, or individual troopers, arriving successively. The most dashing riders, or those mounted on the swiftest horses, will naturally arrive first, and be overpowered by numbers.
4. A charge in deep column is also objectionable; its long flank exposing it too much to artillery fire and to the enemy's cavalry. But when cavalry is surprised, it must charge at once, in whatever order it happens to be, rather than hesitate or attempt to maneuver, for this would expose it to destruction.
5. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to the command to charge, without regard to the circumstances under which it is given, may sometimes lead to results unexpected even to the charging troops themselves. One instance of this was related to me by an old officer of Napoleon's favorite Fifth Cuirassiers. The regiment was on the left of the line of battle. Directly in front of it was an extensive marsh; beyond which rose an eminence, abrupt in front, but sloping gently towards the rear, the crest of which was crowned by formidable Austrian batteries. For two hours the cuirassiers had been standing in line, listening to the roar of battle on the right, and eagerly expecting a summons to go somewhere to engage the enemy. The very horses were neighing and pawing the ground, in their impatience to be off. Just then galloped up one of the Emperor's aids, saying, "Colonel, the Emperor desires you to charge directly on the enemy's batteries opposite your position." The brave colonel, who was one of Napoleon's personal favorites, though chafing at the prolonged inaction of his command, pointed to the marsh, and requested the officer to inform the Emperor of the obstacle in his front, with the existence of which his majesty, he said, was probably unacquainted. In a few minutes the officer came riding furiously back with a message to the colonel, that. "if he did not immediately charge, the Emperor would come and lead the regiment himself." Stung by this reproof, the colonel plunged his spurs into his horse's flanks, and giving the command "Forward," led his regiment, at full gallop, directly through the marsh upon the point that had been indicated. The charge itself was, of course, a failure. The regiment finally struggled its way through the marsh to the opposite side, but leaving behind it a large number of gallant officers and men, who had sunk to rise no more; my informant being of the number who escaped. But the result of this demonstration was most decisive. Seeing that the height on which the Austrians had planted their heavy batteries, and which commanded the entire ground, was the key of the battle, Napoleon had determined to wrest it from them, together with the batteries which crowned it. Accordingly, the evening before, he had dispatched a body of light infantry by a very circuitous route, to turn the position and attack the batteries in rear. He had accurately calculated the time the detachment would require to reach its destination; and when the moment arrived at which it should be ready to commence its attack, he ordered the cuirassiers to charge directly upon the position in front. The Austrian artillery, suddenly attacked in rear, and, at the same time, threatened with a cavalry charge in front, where it had deemed itself perfectly secure, tried to change the position of its pieces, so as to get a fire on its assailants from both directions. But it was too late; the temporary confusion into which it was thrown enabled the French infantry to carry all before it, and the height was won, with all its batteries. So, at Waterloo, Sir Hussey Vivian's brigade of Light Cavalry, which was marching in column by half squadrons, left in front, had begun to form up into line on the leading half squadron, when an order arrived from Wellington to charge. Instantly the charge was made, and, of course, in echelons of half squadrons, extending to the right. The effect of this was that a body of French cavalry on its right, then attacking the British line, was suddenly taken in flank and completely routed.
6. A charge in deep column may sometimes be made necessary by the nature of the ground, which, at the same time, protects its long flanks: as where, in our pursuit of the rebels after the battle of Nashville, in 1864, the Fourth United States Cavalry, approaching them over a narrow turnpike, made a vigorous charge in column of fours, which broke their centre, and, with the help of infantry skirmishers on the flanks, drove them from the ground.
7. When the ground is rugged, in order to lessen the number of falls, the rear-rank, in the charge, should open out six paces, closing up again at the last moment.
8. Cavalry advances to charge at a trot, or at a gallop. A fast trot is better than a gallop, as alignments are not easily kept at great speed. Experience has shown that the best distance from the enemy to begin the gallop, is about two hundred and sixty yards; thence steadily increasing to the maximum of speed. This gradual increase of speed is very important, to prevent the horses from being completely blown on reaching the enemy.
9. Cavalry should not charge by a wood, till it has been carried by our own infantry, if it can possibly be avoided. At the battle of Kollin, in 17.56, Frederick's cavalry, pursuing the Austrians, was taken in flank by some Austrian infantry posted in a wood, and made to retire with great loss.
10. When cavalry is required to charge over unknown ground, it should be preceded by a few men thrown out to the front as skirmishers, in order to scout the ground to be passed over. The neglect of this precaution has sometimes led to great disaster. At Talavera, two cavalry regiments, the First German Hussars and the Twenty-third Light Dragoons, were ordered to charge the head of some French infantry columns. When near the top of their speed they came suddenly upon a deep ravine, with steep sides. Colonel Arentschild, commanding the Hussars, who was in front, at once reined up, and halted his regiment, saying: "I vill not kill my young mensch!" But the other regiment, commanded by Colonel Seymour, which was on its left, not seeing the obstacle in time, plunged down it, men and horses rolling over on each other in frightful confusion. Of the survivors, who arrived on the other side by twos and threes, many were killed or taken; and only one-half of the regiment ever returned. So, at the battle of Courtrai, in 1302, from the French cavalry's omitting to scout the ground they charged over, the Flemings won a great victory. All the elite of the French nobility and chivalry was destroyed, and gold spurs were collected by bushels on the field. It was the French Cannae. The Flemings were drawn up behind a canal, flowing between high banks, and hidden from view. The French rushing on at full gallop, all the leading ranks were plunged into the canal. The entire cavalry was thereby checked and thrown into irretrievable disorder, which extended to the infantry, in their rear. The Flemings, profiting by their confusion, crossed the canal at two points simultaneously, attacked them in flank, and completed their rout So, at the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, Murat, in his great cavalry charge on the Allied centre, had captured twenty-six guns, and was carrying all before him, when he pushed on to the village of Gulden Gossa, where the ground had not been reconnoitred, and could not be distinctly seen from a distance. Here the French found their career suddenly checked by a great hollow, full of buildings, pools of water, and clusters of trees; while the Allied infantry, from behind the various covers afforded by the ground, opened upon them a destructive fire. Being then suddenly charged in flank by the Russian cavalry, they were driven back with heavy loss; the Allies recapturing twenty of the twenty-six guns they had lost. The troopers employed to scout the ground before a charge would not be in much danger from the enemy, who would hardly fire on a horseman or two, especially when expecting a charge.
11. Cavalry must never pursue, unless its supports, are close at hand. In pursuing, it must be circumspect, and not go too far. Union and order are indispensable; for, without them, a slight resistance may suffice to cause a repulse.

VII. --Its Attack on Infantry.

First, as to its ATTACK GENERALLY. Secondly, its attack ON SQUARES.

1. Cavalry must avoid distant engagements with infantry; in which the latter must always have the advantage.
2. The slightest cavalry charge on the flank of infantry will rout it.
3. As to a cavalry attack in front: If the infantry stand firm, the chances are against its success. If the infantry cannot be attacked in flank, the cavalry should therefore wait till it has been shattered by artillery, or has become exhausted, or demoralized, or till it begins to maneuver.
4. If the infantry be in line, or in column, cavalry should attack it in flank; if in square, at one of its angles; if in several squares, at one of its flank ones, so as to avoid a cross-fire from the other squares. If a flank square be broken, the next one to it, being no longer protected by the fire of any other square, may be attacked with the same prospect of success; and so on successively.
5. But if the hostile infantry have supporting cavalry, we must not charge in such a manner as to enable it to take us in flank.
6. To test the infantry about to be attacked, cavalry may pass a few hundred paces in its front, to threaten it, sending forward a few horsemen to fire, gallop forward, and raise a dust. If the infantry, instead of disregarding these movements, begin to fire, it will probably be broken, on the cavalry's charging it at once and vigorously, whether in column or in line. But otherwise, if the infantry reserve its fire, and only sends out a few sharpshooters.
7. Ascending slopes, if not too steep, are not unfavorable to attacks on infantry; for their shots, as experience shows, will then mostly fly too high.
8. On a descending slope, cavalry charges down on infantry with terrible effect; as it then arrives with an impetus which nothing can stop. At Waterloo, a column of French infantry was ascending a steep slope. Suddenly the Scotch Greys cavalry regiment dashed down upon it from above, rode over, and destroyed it.

1. Infantry squares are usually charged in open column; the distance between the subdivisions being a subdivision front and a few yards over; in order that each subdivision may have time to break into the square, or, if unsuccessful, to disengage itself and retire. But the distances should never be so great as to allow the square to reload after firing a volley at the next preceding subdivision.
2. The leading subdivision will usually draw the fire of the square. If this is delivered at very short range, say at twenty paces, it will raise up a rampart of dead and wounded men and horses which will probably suffice to check the following subdivisions, and so repulse the charge. But an infantry square rarely reserves its fire so long; and if the fire is delivered at any considerable distance, no such effect will be produced.
3. A good formation to attack a square is said to be a column of three squadrons, with squadron front, at double distance; followed by a fourth squadron, in column of divisions or platoons, to surround the square, and make prisoners, if it is broken.
4. Before cavalry charges a square, it should be first shattered or demoralized by artillery fire, when this is practicable. In the absence of artillery, sharpshooting infantry skirmishers may, to a certain extent, supply its place.
5. A square should be attacked at one of its angles, which are obviously its weakest and most vulnerable points. But to cover a real attack on an angle, cavalry sometimes makes a false attack on the front of a square.
6. When squares are formed checker wise, cavalry must attack a flank square, and not expose itself to a cross-fire by charging an interior one.
7. Cavalry charging a square firing irregular]y will usually break it. But when the square reserves its fire, and pours in well-aimed volleys at short range, the charge will rarely succeed. The cavalry should, therefore, before charging, use every effort to draw the fire of the square, or of the fronts which threaten it. This is sometimes accomplished by sending forward a few skirmishers to fire on the square.
8. When one square fires to assist another, the firing square should be instantly charged, before it has time to reload. 9. To succeed, a cavalry charge should be made with a desperate, forlorn-hope recklessness, and with reiterated attacks on one point. If the fire has been delivered at very close range, though its effect has probably been destructive, the smoke will momentarily shut out the line of infantry from the horses' view, thus removing the chief obstacle to their breaking through it. The survivors of the fire should therefore rush desperately on. If the French attacks on the British squares at Quatre Bras had been made in this manner, instead of opening to the right and left, and diverging to a flank at the moment of closing, they would probably have succeeded. But this sudden divergence is often the fault of the horses, which instinctively recoil before a serried line of infantry, with bayonets at the charge. Cavalry should, therefore, never be practised on the drill-ground in charging a square, as the horses would thereby acquire the habit of suddenly checking their course, or of diverging to a flank, on arriving at the enemy. This would so strengthen their natural instinct that they could never be got to break a square. Or, at least, when this maneuver is practised for the purpose of instruction, the horses used should never afterwards be taken into the field.
10. The cavalry most formidable to an infantry square are Lancers. Their lances, which are from eleven to sixteen feet long, easily reach and transfix the infantry soldier, while the sabres of the other cavalry are too short to reach him over the horse's neck, and over the musket, lengthened by the bayonet. But Lancers are usually no match against other cavalry, who can parry and ripost before the lance can resume the guard.
11. When cavalry has succeeded in completely breaking a body of infantry, it may often inflict fearful slaughter upon them. At the battle of Rio Seco, in Spain, after Lasalle's twelve hundred horse had broken the Spanish infantry, they galloped at will among twenty-five thousand soldiers, some five thousand of whom they slew.