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Strategic
Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater of War, and
Objective Points of Operations.
by Baron Antoine-Henri de
Jomini (c.1838), trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill,
trs. (Philadelphia: Lippicott, 1861).
Strategic lines and points are of different kinds. Some
receive this title simply from their position, which gives them
all their importance: these are permanent geographical strategic
points. Others have a value from the relations they bear to the
positions of the masses of the hostile troops and to the
enterprises likely to be directed against them: such are strategic
points of maneuver, and are eventual. Finally, there are points
which have only a secondary importance, and others whose
importance is constant and immense: the latter are called decisive
strategic points. Every point of the theater of war which is of
military importance, whether from its position as a center of
communication, or from the presence of military establishments or
fortifications, is a geographical strategic point.
A distinguished general affirms that such a point would not
necessarily be a strategic point, unless situated favorably for a
contemplated operation. I think differently; for a strategic point
is such essentially and by nature, and, no matter how far distant
it may be from the scene of the first enterprises, it may be
included in the field by some unforeseen turn of events, and thus
acquire its full importance. It would, then, be more accurate to
state that all strategic points are not necessarily decisive
points.
Lines are strategic either from their geographical position or
from their relation to temporary maneuvers. The first class may be
subdivided as follows,-viz.: geographic lines which by their
permanent importance belong to the decisive points1 of the theater
of war, and those which have value merely because they connect two
strategic points.
To prevent confusion, we will elsewhere treat of strategic
lines in their relations to maneuvers,-confining ourselves here to
what relates to the decisive and objective points of the zone of
operations upon which enterprises occur.
Although these are most intimately connected, since every
objective point ought necessarily to be one of the decisive points
of the theater of war, there is nevertheless a distinction between
them; for all decisive points cannot be at the same time the
objective of operations. We will, then, define the first, in order
to be more easily guided in our selection of the second.
I think the name of decisive strategic point should be given to
all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence
either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single
enterprise. All points whose geographical position and whose
natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or defense of a
front of operations or of a line of defense are included in this
number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance
the first rank among them.
The decisive points of a theater of war are of several kinds.
The first are the geographic points and lines whose importance is
permanent and a consequence of the configuration of the country.
For example, take the case of the French in Belgium: whoever is
master of the line of the Meuse will have the greatest advantages
in taking possession of the country; for his adversary, being
outflanked and inclosed between the Meuse and the North Sea, will
be exposed to the danger of total ruin if he give battle parallel
to that sea.2 Similarly, the valley of the Danube presents a
series of important points which have caused it to be looked upon
as the key of Southern Germany.
Those points the possession of which would give the control of
the Junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief
lines of communication in a country are also decisive geographic
points. For instance, Lyons is an important strategic point,
because it controls the valleys of the Rhone and Saône, and is at
the Center of communications between France and Italy and between
the South and East; but it would not be a decisive point unless
well fortified or possessing an extended camp with têtes de ponts.
Leipsic is most certainly a strategic point, inasmuch as it is at
the junction of all the communications of Northern Germany. Were
it fortified and did it occupy both banks of the river, it would
be almost the key of the country,-if a country has a key, or if
this expression means more than a decisive point.
All capitals are strategic points, for the double reason that
they are not only centers of communications, but also the seats of
power and government.
In mountainous countries there are defiles which are the only
routes of exit practicable for an army; and these may be decisive
in reference to an enterprise. It is well known how great was the
importance of the defile of Bard, protected by a single small
fort, in 1800.
The second kind of decisive points are accidental points of
maneuver, which result from the positions of the troops or both
sides.
When Mack was at Ulm, in 1805, awaiting the approach of the
Russian army through Moravia, the decisive point in an attack upon
him was Donauwerth or the Lower Lech; for if his adversaries
gained it before him he was cut off from his line of retreat, and
also from the army intended to support him. On the contrary, Kray,
who, in 1800, was in the same position, expected no aid from
Bohemia, but rather from the Tyrol and from the army of Melas in
Italy: hence the decisive point of attack upon him was not
Donauwerth, but on the opposite side, by Schaffhausen, since this
would take in reverse his front of operations, expose his line of
retreat, cut him off from his supporting army as well as from his
base, and force him upon the Main. In the same campaign the first
objective point of Napoleon was to fall upon the right of Melas by
the Saint-Bernard, and to seize his line of communications. hence
Saint-Bernard, Ivrea, and Piacenza were decisive points only by
reason of the march of Melas upon Nice. 2
It may be laid down as a general principle that the decisive
points of maneuver are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if
his opponent operates, he, can more easily cut him off from his
base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same
danger. The flank opposite to the sea is always to be preferred,
because it gives an opportunity of forcing the enemy upon the sea.
The only exception to this is in the case of an insular and
inferior army, where the attempt, although dangerous, might be
made to cut it off from the fleet.
If the enemy's forces are in detachments, or are too much
extended, the decisive point is his center; for by piercing that,
his forces will be more divided, their weakness increased, and the
fractions may be crushed separately.
The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by,-
1. The features of the ground.
2. The relation of the local features to the ultimate strategic
aim.
3. The positions occupied by the respective forces.
These considerations will be discussed in the chapter on
battles.
OBJECTIVE POINTS.
There are two classes of objective points,-objective points of
maneuver, and geographical objective points. A geographical
objective point may be an important fortress, the line of a river,
a front of operations which affords good lines of defense or good
points of support for ulterior enterprises. Objective points of
maneuver, in contradistinction to geographical objectives, derive
their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the
situation of the hostile masses.
In strategy, the object of the campaign determines the
objective point. If this aim be offensive, the point will be the
possession of the hostile capital, or that of a province whose
loss would compel the enemy to make peace. In a war of invasion
the capital is, ordinarily, the objective point. However, the
geographical position of the capital, the political relations of
the belligerents with their neighbors, and their respective
resources, are considerations foreign in themselves to the art of
fighting battles, but intimately connected with plans of
operations, and may decide whether an army should attempt or not
to occupy the hostile capital. If it be concluded not to seize the
capital, the objective point might be a part of the front of
operations or line of defense where an important fort is situated,
the possession of which would render safe the occupation of the
neighboring territory. For instance, if France were to invade
Italy in a war against Austria, the first objective point would be
the line of the Ticino and Po; the second, Mantua and the line of
the Adige. In the defensive, the objective point, instead of being
that which it is desirable to gain possession of, is that which is
to be defended. The capital, being considered the seat of power,
becomes the principal objective point of the defense; but there
may be other points, as the defense of a first line and of the
first base of operations. Thus, for a French army reduced to the
defensive behind the Rhine, the first objective would be to
prevent the passage of the river; it would endeavor to relieve the
forts in Alsace if the enemy succeeded in effecting a passage of
the river and in besieging them: the second objective would be to
cover the first base of operations upon the Meuse or Moselle,-which
might be attained by a lateral defense as well as one in front.
As to the objective points of maneuvers,-that is, those which
relate particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the
hostile forces,-their importance may be seen by what has already
been said. The greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope
of success, lie in some degree in the good choice of these points.
This was the most conspicuous merit of Napoleon. Rejecting old
systems, which were satisfied by the capture of one or two points
or with the occupation of an adjoining province, he was convinced
that the best means of accomplishing great results was to dislodge
and destroy the hostile army,-since states and provinces fall of
themselves when there is no organized force to protect them. To
detect at a glance the relative advantages presented by the
different zones of operations, to concentrate the mass of the
forces upon that one which gave the best promise of success, to be
indefatigable in ascertaining the approximate position of the
enemy, to fall with the rapidity of lightning upon his center if
his front was too much extended, or upon that flank by which he
could more readily seize his communications, to outflank him, to
cut his line, to pursue him to the last, to disperse and destroy
his forces,-such was the system followed by Napoleon in his first
campaigns. These campaigns proved this system to be one of the
very best.
When these maneuvers were applied, in later years, to the long
distances and the inhospitable regions of Russia, they were not so
successful as in Germany: however, it must be remembered that, if
this kind of war is not suitable to all capacities, regions, or
circumstances, its chances of success are still very great, and it
is based upon principle. Napoleon abused the system; but this does
not disprove its real advantages when a proper limit is assigned
to its enterprises and they are made in harmony with the
respective conditions of the armies and of the adjoining states.
The maxims to be given on these important strategic operations
are almost entirely included in what has been said upon decisive
points, and in what will be stated in Article XXI. in discussing
the choice of lines of operations.
As to the choice of objective points) every thing will
generally depend upon the aim of the war and the character which
political or other circumstances may give it, and, finally, upon
the military facilities of the two parties.
In eases where there are powerful reasons for avoiding all
risk, it may be prudent to aim only at the acquisition of partial
advantages,-such as the capture of a few towns or the possession
of adjacent territory. In other cases, where a party has the means
of achieving a great success by incurring great dangers, he may
attempt the destruction of the hostile army, as did Napoleon.
The maneuvers of Ulm and Jena cannot be recommended to an army
whose only object id the siege of Antwerp. For very different
reasons, they could not be recommended to the French army beyond
the Niemen, five hundred leagues from its frontiers, because there
would be much more to be lost by failure than a general could
reasonably hope to gain by success.
There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned,
which are determined more from political than from strategic
considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and
influence the operations and plans of cabinets. They may be called
political objective points.
Indeed, besides the intimate connection between statesmanship
and war in its preliminaries, in most campaigns some military
enterprises are undertaken to carry out a political end, sometimes
quite important, but often very irrational. They frequently lead
to the commission of great errors in strategy. We cite two
examples. First, the expedition of the Duke of York to Dunkirk,
suggested by old commercial views, gave to the operations of the
allies a divergent direction, which caused their failure: hence
this objective point was bad in a military view. The expedition of
the same prince to Holland in 1799-likewise due to the views of
the :English cabinet, sustained by the intentions of Austria on
Belgium-was not less fatal; for it led to the march of the
Archduke Charles from Zurich upon Manheim,-a step quite contrary
to the interests of the allied armies at the time it was
undertaken. These illustrations prove that political objective
points should be subordinate to strategy, at least until after a
great success has been attained.
This subject is so extensive and so complicated that it would
be absurd to attempt to reduce it to a few rules. The only one
which can be given has just been alluded to, and is, that either
the political objective points should be selected according to the
principles of strategy, or their consideration should be postponed
till after the decisive events of the campaign. Applying this rule
to the examples just given, it will be seen that it was at Cambray
or in the heart of France that Dunkirk should have been conquered
in 1793 and Holland delivered in 1799; in other words, by uniting
all the strength of the allies for great attempts on the decisive
points of the frontiers. Expeditions of this kind are generally
included in grand diversions,-to be treated of in a separate
article.
1. I may be reproached with inaccuracy of expression,-since a
line cannot be W point, and yet I apply to lines the name of
decisive or objective points. It seems almost useless to remark
that objective points are not geometric points, but that the name
is a form of expression used to designate the object which an army
desires to attain.
2. This only applies to continental armies, and not to the
English, who, having their base on Antwerp or Ostend, would have
nothing to fear from an occupation of the line of the Meuse.
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