|
AN
ELEMENTARY TREATISE
ON
ADVANCED-GUARD,
OUT-POST,
AND
DETACHMENT SERVICE OF
TROOPS,
AND
THE
MANNER
OF
POSTING
AND
HANDLING
THEM
IN PRESENCE
OF AN
ENEMY.
WITH
A HISTORICAL
SKETCH
OF THE
RISE
AND
PROGRESS
OF TACTICS,
&C. &C.
INTENDED AS A
SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
SYSTEM
OF TACTICS
ADOPTED FOR THE
MILITARY SERVICE OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND ESPECIALLY FOR THE USE OF
OFFICERS OF MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS
BY D. H. MAHAN,
Professor of Military
and Civil Engineering, and of the Science of War,
in the United States Military Academy
NEW EDITION.
NEW YORK:
JOHN WILEY, 56 WALKER STREET.
1861.
P R E F A C E
THE
suggestion of this little compilation originated in a professional
intercourse, some months back, with a few intelligent officers of
the Volunteer Corps of the city of New York.
The want of a
work of this kind has long been felt among our officers of Militia
generally, as English military literature is quite barren in
systematic works on most branches of the military art, especially so
on the one known among the military writers of the Continent as La
Petite Guerre,
or the manner of conducting the operations of small independent
bodies of troops; and but few of these officers are able to devote
that time to military studies, which their pursuit in a foreign
language necessarily demands.
In making this compilation, the works in most repute have been
carefully consulted, and a selection made from them of what was
deemed to be most useful to the class of readers for which it is
intended. The object of the writer has been to give a concise
but clear view of the essential points in each of the subjects
introduced into the work; if he has succeeded in this, he trusts
that the very obvious defects of the work will be overlooked.
An
acknowledgment is here due from the writer to Major-General Sandford,
commanding the First Division of the New York State Militia, and to
H. K. Oliver, Esq., Adjutant-General of the State of Massachusetts,
as well as to the officers generally of the First Division N. Y. S.
M., for their kind aid in bringing forward the work.
U.S. MILITARY
ACADEMY,
October 19th, 1847.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTORY
CHAPTER. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE MOST REMARKABLE EPOCHS IN
THE MILITARY ART FROM THE TIME OF THE GREEKS TO THE PRESENT
CHAPTER I. TACTICS
CHAPTER II. MANNER OF PLACING AND
HANDLING TROOPS
CHAPTER III. POSITIONS
CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED-GUARDS AND
ADVANCED-POST
CHAPTER V. RECONNAISANCES
CHAPTER VI. DETACHMENTS
CHAPTER VII. CONVOYS
CHAPTER
VIII. SURPRISES AND AMBUSCADES
INTRODUCTORY
CHAPTER.
HISTORICAL
SKETCH OF THE MOST REMARKABLE EPOCHS IN THE MILITARY ART FROM THE
TIME OF THE GREEKS TO THE PRESENT.
1. No one can be said to have thoroughly mastered his art,
who has neglected to make himself conversant with its early history;
nor, indeed, can any tolerably clear elementary notions, even, be
formed of an art, beyond those furnished by the mere technical
language, without some historical knowledge of its rise and
progress; for this alone can give to the mind those means of
comparison, without which everything has to be painfully created
anew to reach perfection only after many cycles of misdirected
mental toil.
2. To no one of the arts, that have exercised a prominent
influence on the well-being of society, are these observations more
applicable than to that of arms. To be satisfied of this, there
needs only the most cursory glance at the grand military epochs of
the ancient and modem world. Looking at the art as it was among the
Greeks, under Epaminondas, Philip, and Alexander; and among the
Romans, about the time of Julius Caesar, of each of which epochs
have full authentic records; comparing it with the phases it assumed
in the decline of the Roman Empire and during the Feudal period; and
following if, from the introduction of gunpowder down to the brief
career of Gustavus Adolphus, its first great restorer in Europe- it
seems incredible that anything, short of the most entire ignorance
of the past, could have led professional soldiers to abandon the
spirit of the organization and tactics of the early Greeks and
Romans, so admirably adapted as to call into play the mental and
physical energies of man, for the limbering and unwieldy engines
that clogged the operationsof the Imperial armies of the Empire; or
for the almost equally unwieldy iron-clad chivalry of the middle
ages whose prestige was forever obscured by the first
well-organized infantry brought against it.
3. Coming to a more recent period, did we not remember by
what slow and uncertain stages the march of improvement in other
arts has proceeded, how much has been seemingly owing to mere
chance, rather than to well-directed investigation -how rarely a
master has arisen to imbody into simple formulas the often
complicated processes and obscure doctrines of those who have
preceded him, we should have still greater cause of astonishment,
that, at a time of more general diffusion of science, art and
literature, and particularly of the classical writers of antiquity,
no master-mind should have evoked, from the campaigns of a Marius,
or a Hannibal, the germ of the comparatively modem science of
strategy; nor have gathered, from that almost horn-book of the
schoolboy, Caesar's Commentaries, the spirit of those rapid
combinations by which, with a handful of troops, the great Roman
captain so uniformly frustrated the powerful and oft-repeated
struggles of a warlike and restless people; but, that it should have
been left to the great Captain of this to brush aside the mesh-work
woven by routine and military pedagoguism; while, by the develop-
ment of gigantic plans, made and controlled with almost mathematical
precision, he fixed immovably those principles which, when acted
upon, cannot fail to command success, and which, when overlooked
or neglected, lead to defeat, or else, leaving all to chance, make
of victory only a successful butchery.
4. However desirable it might be to give to this branch of
the military art the consideration to which it is justly entitled,
it does not come within the scope of a work like this to do so. The
most that can be attempted will be to make a brief recapitulation of
the most marked epochs; with a view to draw the attention of the
young military student to the importance of this too-frequently
neglected branch, and to lead him into a field of research, where
the spirit of inquiry will always be gratified, useful additions be
made to his previous stock of acquirement, and hints be gleaned
which he will find fully to justify the correctness of Napoleon's
decision upon the influence which a study of the campaigns of
Alexander, Hannibal and Caesar, must have in the education of a
thorough captain.
5. Tactics of the Greeks.-The Greeks, if not the
earliest people who reduced the military art to fixed principles,
are the first of whose military institutions we have any exact
account; and even of theirs, and of the system of their successors
in conquest, the Romans, several points still remain obscure.
6. A Grecian army, at the period when the military art was in
the greatest perfection among them, was composed of infantry and
cavalry. The former was made up of three different orders of
soldiers; termed, 1. The Opilitai, or heavily armed, who wore
a very complete defensive armor, and bore the sarissa, or
Macedonian pike, a formidable weapon either for attack or defence,
about 24 feet in length. 2. The Psiloi, or light infantry,
who were without defensive armor, and carried the javelin, bow, and
sling. 3. The Pellastae, who were intermediate between the
other two, carrying a lighter defensive armor, as well as a shorter
pike than the oplitai.
7. The cavalry consisted of two kinds. 1. The Cataphracti,
or heavy cavalry, in which both rider and horse were well
covered with defensive armor; the former armed with the lance, and a
sabre slung from a shoulder-belt. 2. A light cavalry of an
irregular character, who were without defensive armor, consisting
of archers and lancers, who also carried a sword, javelin, and a
small buckler.
8. The elementary tactical combinations, or formations,
of the Greeks, were methodical but very simple. An army corps was
composed, 1. Of a Tetraphalangarchia, also termed a grand
phalanx, consisting of 16,354 oplitai. An Epitagma, of 8192
psiloi; and an epitagma of cavalry of 4096 men. The heavy armed, or
infantry of the line, bore to the light infantry and cavalry the
ratio of the numbers 2, 4, and 1.
9. The composition of the grand phalanx was as follows:
Tetraphalangarchia=4 Phalanxes=16 Chiliarchiae=64 Syndagmata=256
Tetrarchiaae= 1024 Lochoi or files=4096 Enomitiae
of 4 men each. It is thus seen that, in the various formations, a
division of the whole could be made by the powers of 2 or 4.
10. This body of infantry was thus officered. Each tetrarchia,
consisting of 4 files, or 64 men,
was commanded by a Tetrarch, who was file leader of
the first file.
11. The syntagma of 16 files, which was the army unit, and
corresponds to our battalion, was commanded by a Syntagmatarch, who
was stationed in front of his command, having an adjutant on his
left; a color-bearer immediately in his rear; on the right a
herald-at-arms, to repeal the commands; and on the left a trumpeter,
to sound the signals. In the rear of the syntagma was stationed an
officer who was the second in command.
12. The phalanx was commanded by a general officer bearing
the title of Strategos.
13. The formation of the peltastae and psiloi was analogous
to that of the oplilai, the number of files being 8, instead of 16
as in the last; and the subdivisions receiving different
denom-inations also.
14. The epitagma of cavalry was divided into two equal parts,
each composed alike, termed Telea. One was placed on each
wing of the line of battle: The telos was subdivided into 5
divisions; the strength of each subdivision being the half of the
one next in order above it. The lowest, termed Ila, of 64
horsemen, corresponding to the modern squadron, was drawn up on a
front of 16 with 4 files, and was commanded by an officer with the
title of Ilarch.
15. The grand phalanx, in order of battle, was divided into
two wings, with an interval of 40 paces between them, and one of 20
between the phalanxes of each wing.
16.The olitai, when formed for exercise or parade, were drawn
up in open order; leaving an equal interval between the men of each
rank and between the ranks. When ready to charge, each man occupied
a square of 3 feet, and the six leading ranks brought their pikes to
a level; thus presenting an array in which the pikes of the sixth
rank extended 3 feet in advance of the front one. In attacks on
entrenchments, or fortified cities, the men of each rank closed
shoulder to shoulder, a sufficient interval being left between the
ranks to move with celerity; the leading rank kept their shields
overlapped to cover their front; the others held them above their
heads for shelter against the weapons of the enemy.
17.The peltast corresponded to our elite corps of
infantry, selected for enterprises requiring both celerity and a
certain firmness.
18.The psiloi performed all the duties usually devolved, in
the present day, upon light infantry, both before and at the opening
of an engagement.
19.The position of the cavalry' in line of battle, was on the
wings. The duties of this arm were mainly to charge that of the
enemy. The cataphracti, for this purpose, were drawn up on each
wing, with a portion of the light cavalry on each of their flanks.
The charge was made by the former, and the latter followed up any
success gained by them.
20.The marches of the Greeks were usually made by a flank.
Sometimes, when the character of the ground permitted, two phalanxes
marched side by side, presenting a front of 32 men, and being in
readiness to offer a front on both the flanks, if necessary.
21.Among the orders of battles among the ancients, that known
as the wedge, or boar's head, is the most celebrated.
In this disposition, the point, or head, is formed of a
subdivision of the phalanx of greater or less strength, according to
circumstances; this being supported by two, three, and four
subdivisions of the same force, one behind another.
22. Tactics of the Romans. Up to the time of Marius,
by whom the germ of the decadence of the military art among the
Romans was sown, a Consular Army consisted of two Legions; and
of two Wings composed of social troops. The legion was
composed of infantry of the line, light infantry, and cavalry. The
infantry of the line was divided into three classes. 1. The
Hastati. 2. Principes. 3. Triarii. These classes wore a
very complete defensive armor; they were all armed with the short
straight Spanish sword; the Pilum, a kind of javelin, about 7
feet in length, used equally to hurl at a distance and in
hand-to-hand engagements was added to it for the two first ; and the
triarii carried the pike.
423. The light infantry, termed Velites, used only the
casque, and a buckler of stout leather, and bore the Spanish sword
and a short javelin, termed the Hasta, only half the length
of the pilum, and used as a missile.
24. The cavalry wore the helmet and cuirass, and carried a
buckler; their arms were a long sabre, the Grecian lance, and a
quiver with arrows.
25. The legion was officered by six Tribunes; sixty Centurions,
with an equal number of officers who served as file-closers for the
infantry; and twenty Decurions of cavalry; besides these
there were the officers of the velites, who fought out of the ranks.
26.Until about the period of the Civil Wars, the legion was
commanded by the tribunes in succession; the tour of duty for each
being two months; afterwards the rule was adopted of placing the
legion in command of an officer styled Legatus. Whilst
the tribunes exercised the command, those, who were not on this
duty, served on all occasions of detachment service generally.
27. Each class of the infantry of the line was subdivided
into ten portions, each termed a Manipulus. The velites were
attached to these by equal portions. The cavalry were divided into
ten troops, termed Turma. To each manipulus there were
assigned two centurions, and two file-closers; and to each turma two
decurions. The velites, although forming a part of the manipuli, had
centurions assigned to them, to lead them in battle.
28. The normal order of battle of the Romans, prior to the
time of Marius, was in three lines: the hastati in the first the
principes in the second; the triarii in the third and the cavalry on
the wings.
29. The manipulus, which was the unit of force, was drawn up
in 12 files, with a depth of 10 ranks, in the lines of hastati and
principes; in the line of triarii there were only 6 files. The right
and left files of the manipulus were led by a centurion, and closed
by an officer file-closer.
30. The manipuli of the three lines were disposed in quincunx
order; the manipulus of one line opposite to the interval between
the manipuli in the one in front, this being the same as the
manipulus front. The intervals between the lines were the same as
the depth of each line. An interval of about 3 feet was left between
the ranks and the files of the manipulus.
31. The same order of battle was followed for the social
troops on the wings. The two legions occupied the centre; but what
interval was left between them, or between the centre and wings, or
how far the cavalry was posted from the infantry, is not well
ascertained.
32.
The velites, before engaging were posted usually between the
intervals of the triarii, and, in part, between those of the turma.
33. In both the legionary and allied cavalry the turma were
formed in 8 files and 4 ranks. An interval the same as its front,
was left between each turma. Of the two officers commanding a turma,
one was placed on the right, the other on the left of the front
rank. Each wing of cavalry was commanded by an officer styled Prefectus.
In some instances the cavalry was placed as a reserve, in rear
of the triarii, and charged when necessary, through the intervals of
the manipuli.
34. In their engagements, the velites performed precisely the
same part as that of the light troops which form the advanced-guards
and advanced-posts of the present day. Watching and occupying the
enemy before the main body is brought into play; then retiring and
taking position to harass him farther, as opportunity may serve.
35. The main body, from its organization, and formation, was
admirably adapted to meet any emergency; presenting, if necessary,
by advancing the manipuli of the principes into the intervals of the
hastati, an unbroken impenetrable front; or, by throwing the
manipuli of the different lines behind each other, leaving an
unobstructed passage to the front, or rear.
36. From the preceding brief exposition of the phalanx and
legionary formations, the respective properties of these two
celebrated bodies, on the field of battle, may be readily gathered.
The legion was evidently far better adapted to circumstances of
locality than the phalanx, which could only move well and
effectively on even ground. In the phalanx, the keeping together of
the entire body, whether in moving onward to bear down the enemy by
its pressure, or in waiting to resist his shock by its inertia-was
everything. In the legion, individual activity and the ease with
which the minipuli lent themselves to every requisite movement,
gave to the entire machine the volition and strength of life. The
attack with the pilum, cast on nearing the enemy, was followed up
immediately by the onslaught with the terrible short straight
sword, equally effective to hew, or thrust with. Each manipulus,
equal to any emergency, was prepared by the celerity with which its
movements could be made, to improve every partial advantage, and
meet the enemy on all sides. Against cavalry alone, was the
impenetrable front of the phalanx, bristling with a forest of
sarissas, superior to the legion. The open order adopted for the
vigorous action of the individual, who to the charge of the horse
had only his pilum to oppose, so inferior to the fire of the musket,
that dread of modern cavalry, proved fatal to the legion on more
than one sanguinary field; till experience taught, that safety might
be found in ranks more serried, and by presenting a front of
pike-heads, borne by the first four ranks of the hastati.
37. Marius, urged either by policy or the necessities of
the times, made a fundamental, and it is thought fatal change, not
only in the organization of the legion, but in other parts of the
military system of his country. By substituting for that glow of
patriotism with which an army drawn wholly from the bosom of the
people is ever found to be animated, the mercenary spirit and its
consequences, he aimed a vital blow against the only real
safeguard of a nation's honor, a national army.
In a despotism, such as Prussia was under Frederick, the
controlling power of an energetic will may, for a season, not only
ward off the attacks of powerful neighbors, but reap conquests, and
struggle with fortitude against great reverses, with an army
recruited from the scum of mankind; but so soon as a state with any
pretensions to republican institutions, substitutes the mercenary
wholly for the national spirit in its armies, its fate is sealed.
Like Rome, during the brilliant career of Marius, Pompey, and
Caesar, and like Venice, under some of her able condottieri, as the
Colonnas and Sforzas, it may, through the singular ability of
particular leaders, still present to the world the dazzling prestige
that military success, under all aspects, carries with it; but the
result is as certain as the ashes that succeed to the flame; anarchy
comes in with all its ills, from the rival pretensions of successful
partisan leaders, and the spectacle is seen which Rome exhibited
at the period referred to; or else the imbecility and utter
prostration which Venice presented, almost from the very moment when
outwardly she had attained to her loftiest might, down to the
pitiable closing scene that wiped her name forever from the book of
independent states
38. In the truly great days of Rome, the days of the Scipios,
the raising of her legions was done with all the best guards of a
constitutional popular election. Six tribunes for each legion,
having first been chosen, either by the consuls or by the popular
voice, the conscripts to fill its ranks were designated in each
tribe by the proper magistrate; these were divided by the tribunes
into the following, classes:-I. The youngest and least affluent were
selected for the Velites; 2. The next in years and wealth for the
Hastati ; 3. The next in the same gradation for the Principes;-
and 4. The oldest and most wealthy for Triarii. The cavalry, or
knights, formed a privileged class, into which only those were
admitted who paid a certain tax. This classification being made, the
tribunes named 10 first and 10 second centurions for
the infantry; with 10 first and 10 second decurions for the
cavalry; and then in concert with the officers thus selected,
divided the classes into manipuli and turma, assigning to each its
two proper officers; whilst these, in turn, selected the two
officers in each maniple who acted as file-closers.
39. Besides the distinction of first and second centurion,
these officers took rank according to class. The first centurion of
the Triarii, termed Primipilus, was the highest in rank of
his grade, and took command of the legion when the tribunes were
absent.
40. In the time of the Scipios the legion was composed of
1200 velites, 1200 hastati, 1200 principes, 600 triarii, and 300
knights.
41. Polybius states that the Consular army contained 6000
legionaries of the line, 2400 velites, and 600 knights of Roman
troops; and of social, or allied troops, 6700 infantry and 800 horse
for the wings; with an additional extraordinary levy of 1700
infantry and 400 cavalry; making a grand total of 18,600 men.
42. Marius introduced the Cohort instead of the
maniple as the unit of force; forming it of three maniples, and
abolishing the ancient modes of classification. The cohort
preserved both the number and designation of the officers attached
to the maniples. It was commanded by the first centurion, until,
under the emperors, it received a superior officer, termed the Prefect
of the Cohort. The use was also introduced of making of the
first cohort a corps d'elite, to which was intrusted the
eagle, the orders of its primiple.
43. The order of battle by cohorts depended upon
circumstances; usually five were placed in the first and five in the
second line. The number of ranks of the cohort was also variable;
depending on the front necessary to be presented to the enemy.
44. With the settled despotism of the emperors arose, as a
necessary consequence, in still bolder relief, the mercenary system.
The substitution of auxiliary cavalry for the Roman knights, and the
introduction of foreigners and of slaves, even among the
legionaries, soon left not a vestige of the ancient military
constitution of the army; and that train of results was rapidly
evolved in which defeat was followed by all its ills but shame, and
the once proud legionary became an object of terror to his master
alone. Effeminacy led to the abandonment of his defensive armor;
and, too craven to meet the foe face to face with his weapons of
offence, the legionary sought a disgraceful shelter behind those
engines of war which were found as powerless to keep at bay his
barbarian opponent, as was the lumbering artillery, chained wheel
to wheel, of the Oriental, to arrest the steady tread of the
English foot soldier.
45. Feudal Period. To follow down the military art
through all the stages of its fall until the use of the feudal
system, could not fall to be a most instructive lesson, did the
limits of this work permit it. Grand as were the occasional deeds of
derring do of the chivalric age, they were seldom more than
exhibitions of individual prowess. Art and consummate skill there
undoubtedly were in this period, but no approach to science,
countries and provinces invaded and ravaged, cities ruined and
castles razed, accompanied by wholesale butchery of the frightened
peasant, mocked with the appointments and title of soldier, such,
without other result, were the deeds of chivalry, and such they must
have continued, had not the Swiss pike, that broke the Austrian
yoke, opened the way to free Europe from its wretched thraldom, and
again to raise the profession of arms to its proper level, in which
mind and its achievements have the first rank, and brute force
combined with mere mechanical skill a very subordinate one.
46. Rise of Art in Modern Times. After the decisive
day of Morgaten, the Swiss name resounded throughout Europe; and
in time it became a point with the leading powers to gain these
mountaineers to their side in their wars and even to retain a
body of them permanently in their pay. The same men who at home were
patriot soldiers, were known abroad, in foreign service, as the real
mercenaries; deserting, or upholding a cause, as the one or the
other party bid highest. The true rank of infantry now began again
to be appreciated; and, with the more permanent military
establishments soon after set on foot, an organization on juster
principles gradually found its way in; and with it some glimmering
views of ancient war.
47. Although able leaders from to time appeared, and order,
with a rude discipline, was introduced among the hireling bands of
which the permanent portions of armies in most European states
consisted, after the first essay of regularly paid troops made by
Charles VII. of France; still no one arose who seemed to comprehend
the spirit of ancient art, until the period of the Revolt in the
Netherlands brought forward the Princes of Orange and Nassau,
William and his son Maurice, both of whom, but particularly the
latter, gave evidence of consummate military talent. The camp of
Maurice became the school of Europe, from which came forth many of
the most eminent generals of that day.
48. Epoch of Gustavus Adolphus. But the great captain
of this age was Gustavus Adolphus; a man who combined the qualities
of hero, warrior, statesman and philosopher; one who early saw, what
in our day is still disputed, that war is both a science and an
art, and that profound and varied learning- an intimate acquaintance
with literature as well as science-is indispensable in the
formation of the thorough soldier.
49. Since the invention of gunpowder, the military art had,
in some respects, retrograded, owing to a misapprehension of the
true value of this new agent. The apprehension expressed by the
bravest of the old chivalry, that it would be the means of
extinguishing noble daring, was soon seen to be not ill-founded, in
the disappearance of individual prowess in the cavalry; whilst the
cumbrous machines put into the hands of the infantry, and the
unwieldy cannon, that but poorly replaced the old engines, rendered
all celerity, that secret of success, impossible. At the fight of
Kintzig for example, which lasted from mid-day to evening, and which
took place after the fork, that served the old musketeer as a rest,
had been suppressed, and the cartridge been introduced by Gustavus
Adolphus, it is narrated, that the infantry were drawn up in six
ranks, and that the fire of musketry was so well sustained that the
slowest men even discharged their pieces seven times.
50. Besides this improvement in small arms, Gustavus Adolphus
was the first to make the classification of artillery into siege and
field-pieces, adopting, for the latter the calibres corresponding
nearly to those used for the same purposes in the present day. He
formed a light regiment of artillery; and assigned to the cavalry
some light guns.
51. Important changes were made by him in the cavalry; its
armor was modified, the cuirassiers alone preserving a light
cuirass, and being armed with a long sword and two pistols.
52. By adopting a new disposition for battle, which he termed
the order by brigade, the idea of which was clearly taken
from the dispositions in the Roman legions, he broke up the large
unwieldy bodies into which troops had hitherto been massed; and thus
gave not only greater mobility, but decreased the exposure to the
ravages of missiles. In his order of battle, each arm was placed
according to its essential properties; so that ease of maneuvring
and mutual support necessarily followed; and peculiar advantages
of position were readily seized upon. To this end, his forces were
drawn up in two or three parallel lines; either behind each other,
or in quincunx order; the cannon and musketry combined; the cavalry
either in the rear of the infantry to support it, or else upon the
wings to act in mass. The cavalry was formed in four ranks.
53. The dispositions made at a halt at night were always the
same as those to receive the enemy, should he unexpectedly attack.
The order of march was upon several columns, at suitable distances
apart.
54. Such, summarily, were the main points in the improvements
made by this great Captain, who, on the field of battle, exhibited
the same warrior instinct, in perceiving and availing himself of the
decisive moment. Betrayed, as every original mind that reposes upon
its own powers alone must be into occasional errors, such, for
example, as interposing, on some occasions, his cavalry between
bodies of infantry, he more thin cancelled them, by being the
earliest to perceive the true power of each arm, as shown, in
massing his artillery, and by keeping it masked until the
effective moment for its action arrived.
55. Epoch of Louis XIV. The wars that preceded the
period of the Spanish Succession, and those induced by it, developed
the seeds sown by Gustavus Adolphus and the Princes of Nassau. The
old chivalry having become a thing that was, there arose that young
chivalry, equally distinguished by valor and courtesy, which
although sometimes assuming a fantastic hue, has transmitted some
of its spirit even to this day, through terrific scenes of popular
struggles, and the loosening of every evil passion engendered by
such strifes, and converted the battlefield into an arena where
glory is the prize contended for; and where, the contest over, the
conquered finds in the victor a brother eager to assist him, and to
sympathize in his mishap. At the head of this distinguished band we
find the Montecuculis, the Turennes, the Condes, the Eugenes, the
Marlboroughs, the Catinats, the Luxembourgs, the Vaubans, and a host
of others. Still, with the exception of some improvements in the
weapons in use, as the changes in the musket, by substituting for
the old match-lock the one with the hammer and flint, the addition
of the bayonet, and the introduction of the iron rammer, together
with a better organization of the artillery, the progress made in
the art during this period was in no degree commensurate with the
grand scale on which its military operations were conducted. The
science of fortification, and its kindred branch, the mode of
conducting sieges, form an honorable exception to this general
stagnation of the art. Each of these were brought by Vauban to a
pitch of perfection that has left but little for his successors to
achieve, so long as the present arms and means are alone employed.
56. it was also in this period that the infantry pike was
abandoned. This change was first made by Marshall Catinet, in the
army he commanded in Italty; and it was gradually adopted throughout
the French service by the efforts of Vauban, who demonstrated the
superiority of the musket and bayonet to the pike both as a
defensive and an offensive weapon. At the same time the distinction
between light and heavy infantry became more prominent, partly from
the introduction of the hand-grenade, for the handling of which men
of the greatest stature and strength were selected, who, from this
missile, were termed grenadiers, and partly, from the
practice of, at first, placing the improved musket only in the hands
of the best marksmen.
57. With the more effective use of fire-arms, the necessity
was felt of adopting a formation both of infantry and cavalry, that
would present a less exposed mark to their balls; but the
disinclination to innovation which seems natural to all professions,
retarded this change, and it was only after the war of the Spanish
Succession that the French gave the example of a formation of
infantry in three ranks. The cavalry was still far from that point
of efficiency which it subsequently reached. Its movements were slow
and timid, and fire-arms, unwieldy implements in the hands of
horsemen, were still preferred by it to the sword.
58. The usual order of battle was in two or three lines; the
infantry in the centre, and cavalry on the wings. The lines were
from 300 to 600 paces apart; having intervals between their
battalions and squadrons, in each equal to their front, so as to
execute with ease the passage of lines. The importance of keeping
some troops in reserve, to support those engaged, and also to be
used for special objects, as turning the flank of an enemy, began
also now to be acted on. Yet the trammels of routine were but
slowly laid aside. Manoeuvres and marches made with a tediousness
and circumspection difficult to be comprehended in the present
day; engagements commenced along the entire front at once; the
intermingling of cavalry with infantry; the power of artillery but
vaguely felt; little appreciation of the resources to be found in
varied ground; battles fought apparently with no other view than to
drive the enemy from the battlefield; such were the prominent
military features of this celebrated epoch, - one of faults, which
deserve to be attentively studied for the lessons they afford even
to the present day.
59. The period intervening between the age of Louis XIV., and
the rise of the Prussian power under Frederick II., was one of
comparative stagnation in the military art. The Duke of Orleans,
the afterwards celebrated Regent, on one or two occasion, gave
promise of military talents. The mad career of Charles XII. of
Sweden, and the achievements of Marshal Saxe--to whom we owe the
modem cadenced step, and the well-known axiom, that the secret of
victory resides in the legs of the soldiers,---are the
most instructive events of this
time; particularly as regards the use of fortified points as
an element of tactics; shown in the destruction of Charles's force
at Pultowa, and in the influence of the redoubts on the renowned day
of Fontensy, with which closed the military life of Marshal Saxe.
60. Epoch of Frederick II. With Frederick II of
Prussia arose a new order of things; a mixture of sound axioms and
execrable exactions upon the natural powers of man, of which the
latter, for years afterwards in the hands of ignorance and military
pedagoguism, became the bane of the art, and the opprobrium of
humanity, through the cruel tasks and wretched futilities with which
the private soldier was vexed; to convert a being whose true
strength resides in his volition into a machine of mere bone and
muscle.
61. What influence the early hardships to which Frederick was
subjected by the half-mad tyrant to whom he owed his being, or the
mercenary material, fashioned under the same regimen as himself,
with which afterwards he was obliged to work, may have had, in
creating this state of things, it is not easy to say; but it seems
incredible that, without some such bias, a man who showed such
eminent abilities, as a statesman and soldier,- who, in most things,
thought wisely, and acted well- should have fallen into an error so
gross and lamentable; one that even the poor shallow philosophy,
of which he made his plaything, ought to have detected and reformed.
62. Frederick's first attention was given to the drill, or
the mere mechanism of the art which he attained a sad celebrity.
Firing executed with a celerity that rendered aim impracticable, and
with an ensemble which made a point of honor of having the
report from a battalion undistinguishable from that of one gun;
manoeuvres calculated with mathematical precision, applied with
equal precision by human beings tutored as dancing dogs; the cane of
the drill-sergeant more dreaded than the bayonet of the enemy; the
field of battle, that arena where genius and military instinct
should be least trammeled, converted into a parade ground, for
carrying on the all the trivial mummery of a mere gala-day: such
were some of the worst features of Frederick's system.
63. But whenever his mind was left free to carry out an
original conception, the master of the art again shone forth. In his
orders of march and encampment, his choice of positions to receive
an attack, he seldom failed to exhibit the consummate general. In
his appreciation of the powers of the oblique order of battle, by
which he obtained such decisive results on the field of Leuthen; the
perfect state to which he brought his cavalry, and the brilliant
success with which he was repaid by it, for his exertions in
restoring it to its essential purposes; his introduction of flying
artillery, and his clear-sighted views as to the proper employment
of this arm generally on the battlefield ; Frederick has high claims
upon the profession, as well as for his written instructions to
his generals, which are a model both of military style and good
sense.
64. Frederick adopted invariably the formation of three ranks
for his infantry, and that of two for his cavalry. From the
preponderating value given to the effects of musketry, his
dispositions for battle were always with lines deployed, and so
disposed as to favor an easy passage of lines. This, and the curious
importance attached to preserving an exact alignment in all
movements, deprived the troops of the advantages of celerity, and
the use of the bayonet, to which the present column of attack so
admirably lends itself.
65.The great authority of Frederick overshadowed, and kept
down, the naturally rebellious promptings of common sense against
parts of his system; and all Europe soon vied in attempts to rival
its worst features, without comprehending its essence. In England,
it was silently imposed upon a hired soldiery without difficulty;
and showed itself in a guise in which, but for the painful
features, the exhibition would have been eminently ludicrous.
Throughout Germany it made its way, in spite of the impenetrable
character of the institutions of the day. In France, a furious,
war of words and writings was waged between the respective
advocates for the true French laissez-faire, and the Prussian
tournequetism and strait-jacketism; as well as upon the more
important question of the deep and shallow formations. If this
contest did nothing more, it provoked discussions in which the voice
of the real soldier was occasionally heard in the din of mere
military pedagogues. it produced the brilliant pages of Guilbert,
and the whimsical scene, so graphically described by De Segur, of
the experimentum crucis, to which he involuntarily, and a
comrade voluntarily were put, to ascertain man's powers of endurance
under the punishment of the flat of a sabre. Then came that event
which swept all these puerilities and most other futilities into one
vortex,-the French Revolution. The value of proper control, and the
evils arising from its want, were here equally demonstrated; and a
just medium it length hit upon, which left to the individual his
necessary powers under all circumstances.
66. Epoch of the French Revolution, and its Sequel.
With the emigration of her nobles, France saw herself deprived of
nearly all those who were deemed capable of organizing and leading
her armies. Her enemies were upon her, still brilliant with the prestige
of Frederick's name and Frederick's tactics; and to these she
had to oppose only ill-armed and disorganized masses driven to the
field, in some cases, more through apprehension of the insatiable
guillotine, than through any other motive, dreading it more than the
disciplined Prussians. But here the man, thrown on his own
resources, lifted up and borne onward by an enthusiasm bordering
on fanaticism, showed himself equal to the emergency. Like our own
first efforts, so those of the French were the actions of
individuals. Where the drill had done nothing, individual military
instinct filled up the want. A cloud of skirmishers soon become
expert marksmen, harassed and confounded lines taught to fire only
at the word of command; the compact column, resounding with the Ca
ira, scattered to the winds feeble, frigid lines, torpid with
over-management, and effected a revolution as pregnant to the
military, as the political one to which it owed its birth was to the
social system. Thus was laid the foundation of the tactics of this
day; a system that partly sprung up in the forests of America; and
upon which, a few years later, the ingenious Bulow would have had
military Europe to base its system.
67. The frenzy of enthusiasm past, reason and discipline
again claimed their rights; and the judging, able generals of
France, brought both the system of skirmishers and the column of
attack, to their proper functions; and the way was prepared for that
Genius who swayed these two elementary facts with a power that shook
Europe to its centre, and caused her firmest thrones to reel.
68. Napoleon appeared upon the scene at a moment the most
propitious for one of his gigantic powers. The elements were
prepared, and although temporarily paralyzed by a state of
anarchy, resulting from the political and financial condition of
the country, they required only an organizing hand to call into
activity their inherent strength. This hand, endowed with a firmness
and grasp that nothing could shake, or unloose, was that of
Napoleon. To him we owe those grand features of the art, by which an
enemy is broken and utterly dispersed by one and the same blow. No
futilities of preparation; no uncertain feeling about in search of
the key-point; no hesitancy upon the decisive moment; the whole
field of view taken in by one eagle glance; what could not be seen
divined by an unerring military instinct; clouds of light troops
thrown forward to bewilder his foe; a crushing fire of cannon in
mass opened upon him; the rush of the impetuous column into the gap
made by the artillery; the overwhelming charge of the resistless
cuirassier; followed by the lancer and hussar to sweep up the broken
dispersed bands; such were the tactical lessons practically a in
almost every great battle of this great military period. The task of
the present one has been to systematize, and imbody in the form of
doctrine, what was then largely traced out.
69. In an intimate knowledge of the peculiar application of
each arm, and a just appreciation of their respective powers; in all
that is lofty in conception, skilful in design, and large in
execution, Napoleon confessedly stands unrivalled. But it has been
urged that, for the attainment of his ends on the battle-field, he
has shown a culpable disregard of the soldier's blood, and has often
pushed to excess his attacks by masses.
To do the greatest damage to our enemy with the least
exposure to ourselves. is a military axiom
lost sight of only by ignorance of the true ends of victory. How far
this may have been disregarded by Napoleon, can be known, with
certainty, only through Napoleon himself. He, who suffered no
important fact, or its consequences, to elude his powers of
analysis, could hardly have been unmindful of the fate of the grand
column at Fontenay, nor have forgotten the imminent danger in which
those squares were placed that, at the battle of the pyramids,
resisted like walls of iron the head-long charge of the reckless
Mameluke, when he launched forth the formidable column of M'Donald
on the field of Wagram.
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